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Abstract 
 
Now is the time for Cyber Flag – initiating and implementing an effective, 
comprehensive and coordinated training environment in the relatively new, but quickly 
developing cyberspace domain.  As is well understood, the rapidly unfolding challenges 
of cyberspace are a fundamental warfare paradigm shift revolutionizing the path to 
victory in future wars.  Moreover, while only time will tell the full affect of cyberspace 
on Worldwide, National, and military security and interests, the development of 
cyberspace, in its early stages, appears to have equivalent magnitude to the development 
of air capabilities during the 20th Century.  A significant test for the Air Force (indeed 
any organization with a credible presence in cyberspace) will be providing a realistic 
training environment that fully meets this challenge.  The Air Force grew out of 
technology and employment of that technology (in conjunction with people, processes 
and doctrine) within the air domain to influence the outcome of war.  Innovation early in 
the airpower era helped solidify a new war-fighting domain that proved decisive in the 
Second World War, ultimately paving the way for the creation of the United States Air 
Force as lead service for organizing, training, and equipping an air-minded military 
capability.  The early air pioneers of the 1920’s could not have imagined what airpower 
would evolve into and the same is true with cyberspace pioneers today.   
Why create another Flag-level exercise?  Realistic training (that which is 
effective, comprehensive, and coordinated) is crucial to success in time of war.  Red Flag 
iv 
 provides critical training within the air domain but now with the evolution of cyberspace, 
a comprehensive training environment is necessary to meet this growing and broadening 
threat.  The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now focuses on achieving 
battlefield gains through the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities with 
realistic training exercises at the center of these efforts.   
Red Flag has and continues to be a great tactical training exercise; Cyber Flag 
would use the best practices of Red Flag (and other realistic training venues) to define a 
future training environment for the cyberspace domain.  This research presents 
justification and an outline for the development of Cyber Flag as well as a formal 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The CONOPS provides a starting point for the basic 
requirements, with three alternative courses suggested for implementing Cyber Flag.  As 
an integral element of Cyber Flag, the Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism 
provides a framework for a low-cost network infrastructure necessary as a basis for a 
realistic training environment.   
There is no better training than the hands-on realism associated with participation 
in an exercise such as Red Flag.  Secretary Michael W. Wynne has a vision for dominant 
operations in cyberspace “comparable to the Air Force’s global, strategic omnipresence 
in air and space.”  This bold vision requires a combination of joint coordination, skilled 
forces and a realistic training environment to bring these efforts together; Cyber Flag is 
the suggested vehicle for accomplishing this. 
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CYBER FLAG 
 
A REALISTIC CYBERSPACE TRAINING CONSTRUCT 
 
 
 
 
 
The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver sovereign options for the 
defense of the United States of America and its global interests -- to fly and fight 
in Air, Space, and Cyberspace. 
 
- 2005 USAF Mission Statement 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
To develop anything, the underlying thought and reason must govern and 
then the organization must be built up to meet it. 
 
 - Brigadier General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Red Flag exercises, well known as training components of air warfare, will also 
become a staple of cyber warfare. 
  
- Secretary Michael W. Wynne [17]
 
The Red Flag exercise, held six times per year at Nellis and Eielson Air Force 
Bases, routinely pits a coordinated team of 80+ airplanes against numerous realistic air 
threats and a robust array of surface-to-air missile systems as participants deliver 
weapons and airdropped cargo on realistic targets and drop zones.  Most participants 
would agree that Red Flag provides the ultimate peacetime test of joint and coalition air 
operations, but a fundamental paradigm shift is the only way to meet Secretary Wynne’s 
vision of a significantly enhanced cyber warfare environment.  This change is so 
monumental that full implementation would fundamentally detract from the critical 
objectives of Red Flag. 
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Beware lest you lose the substance by grasping at the shadow.
- Aesop 
Cyber warfare is a “shadow” of the Red Flag primary mission which is to 
“maximize the combat readiness and survivability of participants by providing a realistic 
training environment,” which they accomplish superbly. [77]  
 
 
 
 
Success demands singleness of purpose. 
- Vince Lombardi 
Conflicts occur when an exercise cannot meet the competing key training 
objectives of multiple participating groups, such as pilots and information operators.  
This is not to say that the objectives of one group are less important or detrimental to the 
other.  It simply means that the existing venue can no longer serve these diverse groups 
of warriors because of growing threats and the needs for training to meet these threats.  In 
short, the time is right for Cyber Flag.   
Background and History of Exercise Development  
The Red Baron I and II Reports summarized the results of the Air Force’s critical 
analysis of the air war over Vietnam some of which was declassified in the late 1990s 
[62].  Both reports cited the lack of training realism as a significant factor in the 75 
percent decrease in enemy vs. United States aircraft kill ratios between Korea (10:1) and 
Vietnam (2.5:1) [8, 62].  In response, Pentagon staffers with a vision to improve training 
realism first created the Red Flag exercise concept in 1975.  The Commander of Tactical 
Air Command, General Robert Dixon, approved the concept, and the first Red Flag began 
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 in November 1975 [15].  Over 30 years later, the constantly improving Red Flag exercise 
continues to train joint and coalition air forces to operate in a realistic air combat 
environment.  Red Flag is also a key reason for the overwhelming conventional military 
success of the United States in recent conflicts [9:63]. 
Black Demon to Bulwark Defender  
The Air Force Information Operations Center (AFIOC) at Lackland AFB created 
the Black Demon exercise in 2000 to test the defensive posture of our military computer 
networks [48].  For many, Black Demon was the equivalent to Red Flag played out on 
computer networks.  Participants defended critical command and control nodes from 
persistent attacks launched by trained adversaries from the 57th and 177th Information 
Aggressor Squadrons, the 92nd Information Warfare Squadron, and the National Security 
Agency.  In 2006, the exercise integrated forces from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 
and was renamed Bulwark Defender.  The expanded exercise focuses on computer 
network defense and as such provides the best venue for joint integration of forces 
dedicated to this mission area.  It does not, to any significant degree, however, address 
the other elements of Information Operations (IO), such as electronic warfare and 
psychological operations, nor does it provide a training environment that integrates 
cyberspace defensive threats and offensive opportunities with those of air-breathing or 
space-based assets.  To capitalize on current cyberspace best practices requires building 
on the success of the Red Flag model within a dedicated environment tailored to this new 
warfighting domain.  Cyber Flag is the suggested vehicle for this change.  
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 To Cyber Flag 
Low-altitude aircraft employment proved to be impractical in the Vietnam War 
leading to the development of medium and high altitude tactics.  Key to these tactics was 
the suppression of enemy surface-to-air missile systems.  A training conflict arose when 
missile systems were electronically jammed during Red Flag, however, because 
participant’s ability to react to those threats became limited.  For many aircrew members, 
the first time they faced actual indications of a surface-to-air missile system was at Red 
Flag.  To preserve this critical training requirement, General Wilbur L. “Bill” Creech 
developed the Green Flag exercise in 1978 to emphasize the enabling capabilities of 
electronic warfare (EW) [15:46].  The Green Flag exercise was the most robust exercise 
of EW assets in the world.   
The present day struggle to integrate the new domain of cyberspace offers similar 
challenges.  The breadth and revolutionary nature of waging war in cyberspace extends 
beyond the goals and objectives of Red Flag and thus suggests the need for a parallel and 
complimentary approach.  The goal of Cyber Flag would be to exercise offensive and 
defensive cyberspace capabilities, closely mirroring how the Chinese have trained since 
the late 90’s in their transformation from a “mechanized PLA force to an 
informationalized force” [14:1].    
The Need for a Dedicated Realistic Training Environment 
“Exercises should be planned and conducted in a way that reflects real war.” 
[9:65] 
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 As alluded to in AFDD 2-1 above, implementing realistic training environments 
for US and coalition force employment is paramount to future military success.  Through 
the successful use of continuous improvement principles, Red Flag has evolved over the 
years, spawning other realistic training venues.  The most notable offspring of Red Flag 
are, Blue Flag to prepare operational planning staffs, Virtual Flag to utilize simulation 
and virtualized combat environments, and Green Flag to provide integration with ground 
forces urgently in need of close air support [9:66].  These exercises, as well as Bulwark 
Defender, provide realistic training environments for aircrew and network operators 
without diluting or detracting from the critical objectives of Red Flag.  Currently, a 
realistic training environment dedicated to cyberspace defensive threats and offensive 
capabilities does not exist.   
The Time is Right for Cyber Flag 
 
 
 
Is there a need for a dedicated Flag focused on the employment of capabilities 
within cyberspace?   
“Airmen will be sent into battles against both known enemy and the unknown. 
Regardless, we will be better prepared to fly, fight and win for our Nation thanks 
to advanced composite force training.  Use these opportunities to innovate and 
improve our tactics, technologies and training.  If we can continue to make 
ourselves more lethal and effective, then we will continue to dominate Air, Space 
and Cyberspace for the Joint Team.” [18] 
 
As General T. Michael Moseley conveys above, realistic training in the Air Force 
must encompasses every possible threat within all possible arenas.  This vision echoes the 
findings of the Red Baron Reports, the genesis of Red Flag.  The proficiency of Airman 
waging this cyberspace war must be equal to that of warriors in the land, sea, air and 
space domains.  This proficiency comes from a “train the way we fight” mentality 
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 dictated by the foundational doctrine of AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare [9:65].   This thesis 
looks at current limitations to realistic training in cyberspace to provide justification and 
a way ahead for Cyber Flag. 
Red Flag, Bulwark Defender, and to a lesser degree Blue Flag, have key and 
critical objectives unlike those envisioned for Cyber Flag.  Cyber Flag will need to 
support the objectives of existing exercises by providing key insight into possible threats 
and offensive opportunities.  As a stand-alone exercise, however, Cyber Flag highlights 
very specific threats and capabilities that are of limited utility to other exercise staffs 
because of conflicts with pre-existing, well-established, and vital training needs.  
Development of Cyber Flag would preserve the effectiveness of established existing 
training while embracing and enhancing the new domain of cyberspace, integrating 
capabilities drawn from across the services and coalition partners into one coherent 
effort.  Bulwark Defender is a key exercise of joint defensive capabilities within 
cyberspace.  Cyber Flag will expand on that focus, enabling a training environment that 
integrates both offensive and defensive cyberspace effects into the mainstream 
operational and tactical planning effort.  A Joint Force Commander for Cyber Flag would 
have the capacity to call on IO options or capabilities as readily as a bomb or other 
kinetic weapons.    
Using qualitative analysis techniques, the Military Decision Making Process 
(MDMP), and case studies of current realistic training exercises, this thesis provides 
insight into the necessary changes needed to make Cyber Flag a reality.   
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 Implementing Cyber Flag 
 This research provides an outline for the development of Cyber Flag and a formal 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The CONOPS provides a starting point for the basic 
requirements, with three alternative courses for implementing Cyber Flag.  As an integral 
element of Cyber Flag, the Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism provides a 
framework for a low-cost network infrastructure necessary as a basis for a realistic 
training environment.   
Preview 
This thesis outlines the Cyber Flag development effort by first analyzing where 
we are and then looking to where we need to go within both the Air Force and the Nation 
as a whole. 
Where We Are 
Chapter II defines the current threats and offensive opportunities for waging war 
in the cyberspace domain.  Chapter III highlights the definition of cyberspace.  Chapter 
IV provides a comprehensive review of the realistic training development to date, while 
Chapter V provides insight into conducting operational planning within cyberspace. 
Where We Need To Go 
Chapter VI explores the methodology used in developing recommendations for a 
realistic training construct.  Chapter VII provides specific proposals for the integration of 
cyberspace capabilities into existing exercises supported by Cyber Flag.  Chapter VIII 
defines a concept for a dedicated exercise environment that fully integrates cyberspace 
7 
 capabilities, Cyber Flag.  Chapter IX provides a proof-of-concept for integrating the Joint 
IO Range (JIOR) with Red Flag using a mobile network replication system called the 
Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism (VIPER).  Chapter X summarizes the 
results and conclusions of this research effort and looks to the future by defining areas for 
additional related research. 
The Air Force Mission – Air, Space, and Cyberspace 
 Cyberspace, as the third “pillar” in the US Air Force’s Mission Statement, 
justifies a dedicated “Flag” to fulfill the training required “to deliver sovereign options 
for the defense of the United States of America and its global interest.”  Cyber Flag 
provides this environment without diluting the critical time tested mission of the 414th 
and 353rd Combat Training Squadrons (Red Flag): 
“Since combat is no place to train aircrews, Red Flag provides a peacetime 
‘battlefield’ within which our combat air forces can train.  Inside this battlefield, 
aircrews train to fight together, survive together and win together” [77].   
 
The time is right to provide an analogous battlefield for the new breed of cyber 
warriors in which they train in concert with those fighting from and in air and space.  
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 II.  The Threats 
 
 
 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a 
hundred battles.  
– Sun Tzu 
The current threats within cyberspace range from nation-states to organized crime 
with nearly equivalent capabilities in all categories based on the low entry cost into this 
warfighting domain.  One major aspect of developing dedicated and focused realistic 
training for the future is to identify a baseline threat and then build the appropriate tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to mitigate such a threat.  The objective of base lining 
is to establish a starting point for generating TTPs that deal with all credible threats.  
When analyzing the threats within cyberspace, it is important to look at the full spectrum, 
from individual actors to government and military forces.   
Hackers 
 While the stereotype of a hacker is that of a young, mostly harmless, teenager on 
a joy ride through various systems, the term hacker applies to a broad range of techno-
savvy individuals who thrive on matching wits with the professionals who design and 
manage the best networks in the world.  On one end of this spectrum are the merely 
curious who want nothing more than to break into vulnerable systems for the challenge, 
like solving a puzzle.  In the article, Understanding the Hackers Mind the authors present 
this type of thought and behavior as an inherent trait of a hacker along with a strong need 
for acceptance within the hacker community [73].  What is not necessarily inherent in the 
hacker’s mind is the penchant for criminal activity.  
9 
 “The Jargon File contains a bunch of definitions of the term `hacker’, most 
having to do with technical adeptness and a delight in solving problems and 
overcoming limits. There is a community, a shared culture, of expert 
programmers and networking wizards that traces its history back through 
decades to the first time-sharing minicomputers and the earliest ARPAnet 
experiments. The members of this culture originated the term `hacker’. Hackers 
built the Internet. Hackers made the Unix operating system what it is today. 
Hackers run Usenet. Hackers make the World Wide Web work. If you are part of 
this culture, if you have contributed to it and other people in it know who you are 
and call you a hacker, you’re a hacker. The hacker mind-set is not confined to 
this software-hacker culture. There are people who apply the hacker attitude to 
other things, like electronics or music -- actually, you can find it at the highest 
levels of any science or art. Software hackers recognise these kindred spirits 
elsewhere and may call them "hackers" too -- and some claim that the hacker 
nature is really independent of the particular medium the hacker works in. There 
is another group of people who loudly call themselves hackers, but aren’t. These 
are people (mainly adolescent males) who get a kick out of breaking into 
computers and phreaking the phone system. Real hackers call these people 
‘crackers’ and want nothing to do with them. Real hackers mostly think crackers 
are lazy, irresponsible, and not very bright, and object that being able to break 
security doesn’t make you a hacker any more than being able to hotwire cars 
makes you an automotive engineer. Unfortunately, many journalists and writers 
have been fooled into using the word `hacker’ to describe crackers; this irritates 
real hackers no end. The basic difference is this: hackers build things, crackers 
break them.” [74]  
 
As the above quote explains, “crackers” engaged in overtly criminal activity (such 
as identity theft, denial of service attacks, or defacing websites).  Criminal activity is 
increasing fueled by the “white market,” which “exists to buy and sell software flaws 
(back-door vulnerabilities with no available patch to fix them)” and creating “a virtual 
arms trade in potentially significant security threats” [72].  This underground economy 
supports the “black market” which barters, among other things, stolen identities as well 
as networks of compromised machines (Botnets) for use in denial of service attacks [72].  
Criminals have spent up to $75,000 for the use of computer vulnerabilities that enabled 
large-scale theft of personal information [72].  
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 After recently attending the first-ever Dayton, Ohio hacker convention, HackCon, 
this researcher realized just what a diverse and technically fanatical group hackers are.  
The goal of this convention was to bring together the efforts of hackers worldwide to 
“take the word ‘hacker’ back” [60].  As mentioned above, hackers have historically been 
associated with those conducting illegal activity such as breaking into government 
computer systems.  HackCon aimed at drawing a clear distinction between the activities 
of hackers and crackers.  Increasingly, the pool of computer capabilities within the hacker 
community provides a remarkable depth and breadth of experience in identifying critical 
enemy attack vectors in cyberspace.  In addition, skills enabled by this expertise, provide 
a largely untapped level of experience in the capabilities the military must establish 
among cyber warriors.  Cyber Flag would provide a realistic training environment to 
build on the basic skill set in order to hone the capabilities of the fighting force as a 
whole.  
Terrorist Organizations 
As is well known, terrorists have increasingly turned to cyberspace as a means of 
both communication and attack.  Recruiting hackers from around the world has allowed 
organizations like Al Qaeda to prosper in cyberspace.  A 2005 Washington Post article 
highlights that Al Qaeda was “the first guerrilla movement to move from physical space 
to cyberspace” [66].  Web-based training, communications, and logistical support 
increasingly enable terrorists to conduct successful attacks on forces within Iraq [66].  
This virtual base of operations enabled by the anonymous nature of the Internet also 
facilitates the distribution of detailed attack plans including satellite imagery and Global 
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 Positioning System (GPS) coordinates.  The activities of Al Qaeda are not limited to Iraq.  
As an organization without a state sponsor, Al Qaeda must rely on passive sponsorship, 
enabled largely through the Internet.  There are as many as 17,000 Al Qaeda websites 
used for propaganda, recruiting, and fund raising [71].  Although there is increased 
potential for laws prohibiting the spread of terrorist ideals, it is difficult to suppress these 
websites because they often simply change addresses once discovered [71].  
By multiplying these capabilities in proportion to the size of a larger force, one 
begins to get an idea of how capable a nation-state actor can become if they choose to 
emphasize cyberspace capabilities.   
Russia v. Estonia  
“The 10 largest assaults blasted streams of 90 megabits of data a second at 
Estonia’s networks, lasting up to 10 hours each. That is a data load equivalent to 
downloading the entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 
hours.” [68] 
 
The removal of the Bronze Soldier war memorial in Tallinn prompted a massive 
Russian cyber attack, as described above, on web servers associated with Estonian 
government, newspaper, banks, and businesses in May 2007 [61].  While the Russian 
government denied the attack, the scale and resources involved may indicate otherwise.  
The attacks used a distributed denial-of-service attack from thousands of machines to 
crush the routers and switches comprising Estonia’s digital infrastructure [68].  A heavy 
use of global Botnets, purchased on the black market, helped boost the number of 
machines involved in the attack, many of which were unknowing foot soldiers [68].   
The capabilities of nation-state actors in cyberspace are increasingly finding their 
way to center stage.  The recent assault on Estonia highlights the strength of the Russians 
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 within the cyberspace domain.  The attacks prompted a rapid response from both NATO 
and the European Union and sparked bitter debate on the legal aspects of such attacks. 
Chinese IO Strategy 
China has emerged as one of the most capable forces in cyberspace for a number 
of reasons, including the establishment of over-arching IO strategy, presence of 
conventional military capability gaps, increased national defense spending, focus on IO 
education, and increases in IO operational readiness levels.   
Chinese IO strategy in some ways closely mirrors US IO doctrine due in part to 
China’s suspected analysis of Joint Pubs 3-13, 3-13.1, Army Field Manual 100-3 and 
Joint Vision 2010/2020 [23].  Chinese IO strategy has also likely evolved from careful 
study of such information-intensive US military operations including Desert Storm and 
Kosovo, as well as Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  It is important to 
note that actual documented Chinese IO doctrine is largely unavailable and most Chinese 
IO strategic views come from publicly released literature.  The Chinese senior military 
leaders seem to realize that all future fighting forces will be increasingly dependent on 
access to and exploitation of information in the domains of air, sea, land, space, and 
cyberspace.  The Chinese view of IO within cyberspace is a phenomenon that is changing 
the nature of war from one focused on seizing territory or destroying forces, to one 
seeking to paralyze the adversary’s information systems and to destroy his will to resist 
[26].  The IO strategy of China drastically diverges from that of the US in that they 
believe in the application of Maoist principles with the responsibilities for executing IO 
laying not only in the hands of the military but with the civilian populace as well, the 
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 New People’s War [25].  Furthermore, China views their IO capabilities as a pre-emptive 
weapon to establish information dominance, believing that superior tactics can make up 
for inferior technology [25].  Key strategy components include attacking enemy 
command and control systems, tactics to attack enemy commanders and headquarters at 
every level, information deception/concealment procedures, and imbedded information 
technology weapons to include computer viruses [24].  Other objectives include [25]: 
1)  Targeting enemy networks linking political, economic, and military 
installations of a society in general. 
2)  Developing, improving and utilizing China’s information weapons in a 
concentrated way. 
3)  Emphasizing mobile war in the context of IO. 
4)  Conscientiously organizing sabotage operations to exhaust and wear down the 
enemy. 
5)  Organizing specialized IO troops equipped to carry out IO against the enemy’s 
information infrastructure. 
The Chinese categorize IO into narrow and broad applications.  Narrow IO 
consists of destruction of enemy command and control, electronic warfare, military 
deception, operational secrecy, and psychological operations [28].  Broad IO consists of 
computer virus warfare, precision warfare and stealth warfare [28].  
China’s Conventional Military Capability Gaps  
An enormous gap separates China’s conventional military capabilities from its 
aspirations to be a dominant world power.  Cyberspace seems to be the domain the 
14 
 Chinese feel offers an opportunity to be on par with (and possibly leapfrog) other major 
global powers.  Whatever China’s concerns and intentions, its capacity to act upon them 
in conventional military ways, hostile to US interests, is severely limited, and will remain 
so for many years [29].  This gap, coupled with China’s desire to become a major 
economic/political power in the world community, makes asymmetric forms of warfare 
increasingly more attractive.  Information Operations is an asymmetric capability that 
will allow China to engage a far more superior military.  China continues to seek 
unorthodox methods and capabilities that avoid or undercut an adversary’s strengths 
while inflicting disproportionate damage on the enemy [23].  There exist strong feelings 
among many Chinese military analysts that cyberspace will be the critical factor in 
successful future military operations.  Information Operations provide relatively low-cost 
asymmetric weapons, which enable a long-range power projection capability against US 
forces that was never before thought possible [25].  This capability can reach directly into 
the American homeland to attack vulnerable critical infrastructures to influence or 
manipulate domestic public perceptions.  This alone will have effects far beyond the 
limited power projection capabilities of China’s conventional military forces [23].  China 
aims to leapfrog generations of technologies and capture supremacy in the cyberspace 
domain [23].   
China’s Increased National Defense Spending/Focus on IO Education 
Other important factors in establishing China as a baseline cyberspace threat is 
their steadily increasing national defense budget and continued focus on IO education 
programs and institutions.  As Table 1 shows, in 2000 the Chinese defense budget 
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 exceeded 14.6 billion USD, an increase of 17.7 percent from the previous year, with the 
2005 military spending at 29.9 billion USD.   
Table 1 Chinese Defense Spending 
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The US government analysis anticipates double-digit percentage increases in 
Chinese defense spending over the next decade [31].  More importantly, China’s defense 
budget may be as much as 40 to 70 percent higher than publicly released government 
budget estimates and at the current rate of growth, China will be spending more on 
defense than the US or any of its allies by the year 2025 [30].  This budget buildup stems 
from the urgent need to replace antiquated military equipment, establish and solidify a 
quality oriented manufacturing base and to bring about reform in weapons system 
acquisition.  Information technology (IT) is one of the key areas that will receive a 
defense-spending windfall as a result [30].  China’s IT sector is probably the most 
organizationally innovative and economically dynamic producer of equipment for 
China’s military.  China continues to invest in commercially applicable IT and broadly 
funds civilian and commercial research institutes which can conduct basic and applied IT 
research more effectively and efficiently than the military.  China is also allocating major 
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 resources to further IO education efforts, providing the Chinese military with indigenous 
IO capabilities and a professional cadre needed to wage the battles of tomorrow.  There 
are several organizations charged with provided IO education to the Chinese military 
[14]:  
1)  The Communications Command Academy is the lead IO educational 
organization-providing curriculum in strategic analysis, operational/tactical 
requirements, command, and tactics. 
2)  The Information Engineering Institute aims to educate professionals in hi-tech 
warfare involving such areas as remote image information engineering, 
satellite navigation, position engineering, map data banks, information 
security, modern communications technology and space technology. 
 3)  The Science and Engineering University provides initial IO education to new 
military personnel. 
 4)  The National Defense Science and Technology University focuses on 
supercomputer technology, reconnaissance, monitoring technology, precision 
guidance technology, electronic warfare and information warfare. 
5)  The Navy Engineering College seeks to merge arms and information by 
integrating electronic information with weapons systems.   
Moreover, the Chinese categorize the IO education and training audience into three 
categories [27]:  
1) Senior leaders with little current information literacy 
2) Future leaders that must enhance their information abilities 
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 3) Younger personnel who are information savvy   
Each category receives training in [27]: 
1) Basic IO theory 
2) Electronic warfare and radar 
3) IO rules and regulations 
4) IO strategy and tactics 
5) Theater and strategic IO  
6) Information systems 
7) Command and control systems 
8) Information weapons and applications 
9) Simulated IO scenarios 
From this perspective, it is apparent that the Chinese have established a sound 
educational base with both broad and focused training programs, potentially exceeding 
that of their United States counterpart. 
China’s Increase in IO Operational Readiness Levels 
The third major element in assessing China as the baseline cyberspace threat is 
their recent increase in IO operational readiness and simulated IO exercises.  Because the 
Chinese believe that IO is the New People’s War, China’s strategy for executing IO 
operations falls largely on its 1.5 million-person reserve force.  Currently, China is 
turning entire reserve force districts into mini IO regiments.  The active military is still 
responsible for developing IO strategies and plans but civilians, more precisely the 
reserve forces, will be leading IO execution in battle.  For example, the People’s Armed 
18 
 Forces Department (PAFD) of the Echeng District has 20 city departments of 
militia/reserve IO regiments.  These regiments consist of network warfare, electronic 
warfare, intelligence, and psychological warfare battalions as well as 35 technical squads.  
The PAFD also established the first reserve IO training base to serve these units.  The 
city of Ezhou conducts national defense mobilization exercises, recruiting technical 
soldiers and procuring IT equipment for the National Defense Mobilization effort.  The 
Fujan Province uses reserve and militia forces to carry out EW, network attack/defense, 
and radar reconnaissance operations.  In the city of Datong, high-technology units focus 
on information security and seizing computer network domains [14].  China’s intentions 
are obvious and there is increasing evidence that they are putting their IO theory and 
training into practice in state of the art realistic training environments.  As indicated 
previously, there have been frequent reports of hacker attacks against the US that 
originate from China, an effort dubbed “Titan Rain” by the US Government [42].  The 
Washington Post reported in August 2000 that hackers connected to the Chinese 
government penetrated the Los Alamos computer system and downloaded sensitive 
information equivalent to a 3-foot high stack of paper [75].  A Los Alamos representative 
reported that enormous amounts of Chinese hacking activity hits Los Alamos 
continuously [75].   
“During one 10-month period in the late 1990s, officials said, intelligence 
agencies recorded 792 computer security incidents, including 324 attacks from 
outside the United States.  The attacks included efforts to gain password files, 
probes of computer defenses and scans of system vulnerabilities to intrusion.  
Several computer systems have been compromised by intruders who gained 
"root" access to Energy Department computer systems. Such access allows 
hackers to gain complete access and total control over computer systems that 
permit them to see all information on the systems, the officials said.  Many of the 
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 attacks are from foreign intelligence services seeking restricted nuclear 
information or other sensitive material, particularly on science and technology.” 
[75] 
 
 A more recent attack on Los Alamos resulted in the compromise of visitor logs, 
including date of birth and social security numbers of thousands of scientists visiting the 
laboratory between 1990 and 2004 [76]. 
“The attack was described as being conducted through several waves of phishing 
emails with malicious attachments, starting on Oct. 29. Although not stated, these 
would presumably have launched Trojans if opened, designed to bypass security 
systems from within, which raises the likelihood that the attacks were targeted 
specifically at the lab.” [76] 
 
China understands the importance of conducting IO exercises and does so quite 
frequently.  These exercises test technologies, refining operational planning/procedures, 
tactics development, and network reconnaissance.  The Chinese often target Taiwan and 
the US for their exercise scenarios.  Recent IO exercises included the Chengdu Military 
Region conducting a confrontational Internet campaign exercise.  This exercise provided 
training for the planning of an IO campaign with the overall goal of establishing 
information control of the adversary [27].  The Beijing Military Region conducted 
computer network campaigns aimed at reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, 
interference, counter-interference, blocking, air strikes, and counter-air strikes.  The 
Chinese also conducted national exercises, as far back as 1998, aimed at uniting and 
coordinating several military regions throughout the country to test IO capabilities and 
assess their own weaknesses [14].  The Chinese are becoming increasingly more 
aggressive in their overall pursuit of IO techniques for counter-attack and cyber-defense.  
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Cyber Flag would be a parallel US realistic training environment to prepare for and 
overcome this threat when called upon.  
 III.  Cyberspace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is something more important than any ultimate weapon. That is the ultimate 
position — the position of total control over Earth that lies somewhere out in 
space.  That is . . . the distant future, though not so distant as we may have 
thought. Whoever gains that ultimate position gains control, total control, over 
the Earth, for the purposes of tyranny or for the service of freedom.  
 
 - Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, 1958 
Before outlining the evolution of realistic training in cyberspace, it is important to 
refine the definition of this domain and the challenges associated with the Air Force 
becoming the lead service in cyberspace.  The extraordinary challenges faced in 
integrating the decisive domain of cyberspace into the USAF mission are not unlike those 
faced in the infancy of the Air Force.   
The Air Force grew out of technology and employment of that technology (in 
conjunction with people, processes, and doctrine) within the air domain to act as a 
deterrent to potential enemies and, when attacked, to successfully influence the outcome 
of war.  Innovation early in the airpower era helped solidify a new war-fighting domain 
that proved decisive in the Second World War, ultimately paving the way for the creation 
of the United States Air Force as lead service for organizing, training, and equipping an 
air-minded military capability.  Likewise, we are now in the infant stages of the cyber era 
where the addition of cyberspace is revolutionizing the way we will fight and win future 
wars.  A significant challenge will be providing a realistic training environment that 
reflects this change.  This is far different from the normal evolution of Red Flag over its 
30-year history but is similar to the technological advancement comprising a core 
element in the history and mind-set of the Air Force.  The early air pioneers of the 1920’s 
22 
 
 could not have imagined how airpower would evolve and the same is true with 
cyberspace today.  In a recent Letter to Airmen, Secretary Wynne highlighted the 
incredible technological advancements, which are yet again transforming the face of war. 
“Our adversaries realize the asymmetric opportunities of cyberspace.  They 
attempt to access American industrial servers that contain sensitive data, exploit 
electromagnetic energy to try and jam or misdirect our precision weapons, and 
use radio transmitters to detonate improvised explosive devices, killing 
Americans, Coalition allies, and innocent civilians.” [3] 
 
While the recent emphasis on cyberspace defense is a step in the right direction, 
US military preparations are equivalent at best to some other international powers, as 
noted earlier.  Hardly a week goes by without some news report about how Chinese 
entities (government, military, or individual actors) have compromised computers and 
various US networks.  This series of coordinated attacks beginning in 2003 (Titan Rain), 
is just one indication that the United States has already fallen victim to Chinese offensive 
information warfare activity [42].  One need also look at the recent public release of the 
Aurora experiment to understand the effects that are possible within cyberspace [43].  
Although many of the details remain classified, Aurora demonstrated how one of the 
most commonly used power generators within the domestic electrical grid of the United 
States could be destroyed using computer network attack.  During this test, the generator 
responds to a series of malicious computer control commands by shaking violently and 
then grinds to a complete halt in a cloud of smoke.  The exploitation of this same 
vulnerability across the nation would bring extended power outages and crippling 
economic repercussions.  Government economist Scott Borg summarizes the 
consequence of such an attack as follows: 
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 "It's equivalent to 40 to 50 large hurricanes striking all at once," Borg said. "It's 
greater economic damage than any modern economy ever suffered. ... It's greater 
than the Great Depression. It's greater than the damage we did with strategic 
bombing on Germany in World War II.” [43] 
Cyberspace Defined 
The September 2006 cyberspace definition endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is: 
“A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic 
spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via networked systems and 
associated physical infrastructures.” [5] 
 
Nearly two years later, there continues to be no published service or joint doctrine 
that defines cyberspace.  This leads to differing views about what cyberspace comprises 
and what constitutes a force operating in this domain.  Discussions within and across the 
services are complicated by a lack of common lexicon which clearly delineates what 
forces and capabilities (such as electronic warfare) fall within the cyberspace domain.  
Doctrine is fundamental to discussing, understanding, and coordinating warfighting in all 
domains.  Doctrine also supports senior decision makers when dealing with the financial 
strain of the “long war.” [44] 
The services do have mature doctrine on information operations (IO), however.  
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Army Field Manual 3-13, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication 3-36 and Joint Publication 3-13 comprehensively cover IO but the 
conceptualization of cyberspace as a domain is absent from nearly all formal military 
documents.  Table 2 summarizes the terminology in current literature and formal doctrine 
used to define the domain in which the services conduct IO.  
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 Table 2 Cyberspace Terminology in Doctrine 
Service Current Literature 
Terminology 
IO Doctrine Terminology 
Air Force Cyberspace (8th AF 
CONOPS) 
Information Spectrum or Information 
Architecture (AFDD 2-5) 
Army  Information Domain Information Domain (FM 3-13) 
Navy Information Infrastructure Information Infrastructure (OPNAV 
3430.26) 
Marines Information Environment Information Environment (MCWP 3-36) 
Joint Cyberspace (JCS) Information Environment (JP 3-13) 
 
The inconsistency in cyberspace doctrine restricts our ability to integrate non-
kinetic information operations and kinetic effects within the new domain of cyberspace.  
For example, if the Joint Force Commander requires a cyberspace effect, such as 
disrupting or destroying a command and control network, are we restricted to current IO 
capabilities?  Most would agree that the answer is no.   
What is a cyberspace effect?  Dropping a bomb on a facility housing a critical 
network node could have an equal effect to that of injecting a computer virus that 
disables the network.  Both options affect the adversary’s ability to exchange data via 
their network and thus manifest themselves within the cyberspace domain.  The explosive 
power of a bomb also has second and third order effects that ripple through the air and 
land domains making the computer virus attack potentially more appealing primarily due 
to the ease of reconstitution.  In addition, a virus or other type of malicious software on 
an adversary machine may provide capabilities to the attackers even more valuable than 
the destruction of the network.  Most people can conceptualize this because of the 
constant threat of Spyware infecting their personal computer.  Few are aware of programs 
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 called Rootkits that can cloak these activities within the inner workings of the computer 
operating system, making them undetectable by most, if not all, antivirus software.  
Debates regarding the use of non-kinetic versus kinetic options are just recently coming 
into mainstream military thought.  China is far beyond these discussions, having already 
established consistent policy and doctrine, some of which is available through open 
sources, and an accompanying large-scale information warfare force that trains within 
realistic cyberspace environments [14].   
In spite of how many credible experts have described it to date, the important 
reality of the cyberspace domain is that it encompasses far more than just computer 
networks.  Cyberspace is a sphere that includes every element of both analog and digital 
data just as airspace includes every air molecule [5].  Cyber Warfare includes Network 
Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Directed Energy as means of achieving effects within 
cyberspace.  One need only look at the control these digital elements have over banking, 
power distribution, and personal communications to realize the true extent of this domain, 
a domain the military must defend.  As Secretary Wynne recently wrote: 
“Cyberspace is a domain, like land, where each of the principles of war applies. 
To grasp this concept requires a major institutional and cultural shift in war 
planning and operations.” [17] 
 
The Chinese realized this some time ago and, in many respects, capitalized on the 
fact that the United States has not emphasized the enabling capabilities of operations 
within and through cyberspace.  The conduct and resulting effects of information 
operations may not be as visually impressive as kinetic operations involving physical 
destruction, but an effective IO offensive capability, on a large-scale basis, provides 
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 destructive potential on par with wide scale employment of nuclear weapons.  In fact, due 
to our own dependence on cyberspace, the US is more susceptible to asymmetric attacks 
against our cyberspace infrastructure than we are to conventional attacks.  The rapidly 
advancing technology (typically developed far quicker than appropriate defensive 
countermeasures) that makes our country so powerful represents a giant Achilles heel for 
which we must develop the most effective and cost efficient techniques to protect it 
before the first large-scale paralyzing 9/11 cyberspace event.    
Cyberspace Fighting Force 
With this vulnerability in mind, the proper posturing of forces to wage war in 
cyberspace is critical to the future of the Air Force and our nation.  Thus, 18 September 
2007 brought the activation of the Cyber Command (provisional) at Barksdale AFB 
under Major General William T. Lord [45].  An accompanying force development effort 
for this new major command will bring personnel from various career fields (such as 
electronic warfare, communications, and space control) which are critical to cyberspace 
operations.  The Cyber Command compliments both the Naval Network Warfare 
Command and the Army 1st Information Operations Command with respect to joint 
operations.  The Air Force now fully embraces cyberspace as an operational domain; a 
domain in which we attack and defend targets, achieve effects, and hold adversary 
capabilities at risk.  In keeping with this theme, Cyber Flag provides the training 
compliment to and for Cyber Command.   
A recent Air & Space Power Journal article Defining Information Operations 
Forces [37] comprehensively covered the capability gaps within and between the services 
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 regarding the IO mission.  This work contends that these gaps exist primarily since 
previous attempts to define and build a dedicated IO force were unsuccessful [37].  Cyber 
Command establishes the leadership to build a robust force but, as discussed earlier, 
pitfalls still exist because of the slow evolution of military doctrine for cyberspace.  
Although doctrine must eventually catch up to capabilities in cyberspace, an effective 
training environment provides a viable springboard for avoiding the current hazards. 
Joint and service doctrine, such as Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air 
Warfare, clearly and consistently defines missions conducted within the air domain, such 
as Offensive Counter Air and Close Air Support.  The IO doctrine on the other hand, has 
morphed several times in the last decade as we struggled to define IO in a language that 
best supports the war-fighting mission.  This has led to variation between the service 
level doctrine and confusion when integrating joint IO capabilities.  Current joint doctrine 
is the final authority for these service level inconsistencies.  The IO core capabilities, as 
defined by Joint Publication 3-13, encompass Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security (OPSEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), 
and Computer Network Operations (CNO).  Table 3 summarizes their definitions.  
These core capabilities define operations within an “information environment,” 
which consists of physical, information, and cognitive domains [7].  As suggested earlier, 
we have an approved DoD definition of cyberspace, but it is not immediately clear how 
cyberspace meshes with this information environment.  Further, we have yet to decipher 
cross-domain operations, for example, operations through cyberspace that may yield 
physical effects (like Aurora), and vice versa.    
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 Table 3 Joint IO Capabilities [7] 
IO 
Capability 
JP 3-13 (13 Feb 06) Definition 
PSYOP Planned operations to convey selected truthful information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. 
MILDEC Those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision 
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, 
thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) 
that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ 
mission. 
OPSEC A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 
analyzing friendly actions and other activities to: identify what 
friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently 
accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary 
decision makers critical information about friendly forces and 
intentions; and cause adversary decision makers to misjudge the 
relevance of known critical friendly information because other 
information about friendly forces and intentions remain secure. 
EW Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) and 
directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the adversary.
CNO Capabilities used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, 
and defend electronic information and infrastructure. 
 
We will continue to struggle with effective inter-service integration without a 
commonly accepted understanding of what cyberspace is (and is not).  Fortunately, we 
are seeing more publication of ideas, such as the recent A&SPJ article Cyberspace 
Defined [38].  Cyberspace Defined clearly articulates the fact that cyberspace is a domain 
and delineates the fact that Information Operations are one of several means of achieving 
effects within this new domain.  The Air Force has struggled with communicating this 
fact since the addition of cyberspace to the mission. 
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 Further adding to the confusion, and frequently impeding progress, is the current 
convention in military circles to attach the word “cyber” to any concept remotely 
associated with the cyberspace domain.  This leads to terms like “cyber doctrine”, “cyber 
forces” or simply “cyber capabilities.”  Such terminology tends to blur the overall 
concept of cyberspace as warfighting domain on par with air, land, sea and space 
operations.  As an example, consider that information operations (things we do to achieve 
effects) should not simply be lumped into cyberspace (an environment in which we do 
things).  Performing information operations in not limited to just cyberspace.  Many 
psychological and military deception operations are not limited to the cyberspace domain 
but rather are classic instances of IO.  One example would be the common practice of 
distributing leaflets like the one in Figure 1 which says “Osama bin Laden $25,000,000 
reward [47].” 
    
Figure 1 IO PSYOPS Outside of Cyberspace [47] 
Doctrine typically defines how forces are organized and employed within a 
domain rather than describing the domain itself; in which case, the term “cyber doctrine” 
is inappropriate.  “Cyber capabilities” describes capabilities solely within and through 
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 cyberspace but perhaps it is more appropriate to use IO to describe these capabilities for 
the sake of consistency.  As discussed above, there are kinetic capabilities that manifest 
themselves in cyberspace.  Should we consider these “cyber capabilities?”  Is the pilot 
who drops the bomb on a network building and ultimately disables the information flow a 
“cyber operator?”  Such questions are not new, but the result is that cyberspace defines a 
domain in which we conduct operations; doctrine is how we formally define and discuss 
those operations.  Force structures across the services must consistently conform to this 
model. 
Definitions are vital for providing a common understanding among the diverse 
organizations that conduct operations within cyberspace.  Another important issue 
regarding the cyberspace definition is that it encompasses far more than just computer 
networks.  As noted earlier, Secretary Wynne describes cyberspace is a domain that 
includes every element of both analog and digital media just as airspace includes every 
air molecule [5].  With this idea in mind, it is easy to realize the broad range of skills that 
war fighters within this domain require.  Current training in fundamental network 
operations builds the basic skill set [37].  Expertise on foreign and domestic cyberspace 
systems must also extend from outside Internet Protocol (IP) based networks and to 
applications that are more pervasive; such as telephony, Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and Command and Control systems. The nexus of a 
comprehensive knowledge base on the vulnerabilities of all network systems comes from 
the legal and technical expertise gleaned through realistic training envisioned in and by 
Cyber Flag.  Because of the stealth and speed of hacker attacks (the Slammer Worm 
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 propagated worldwide in minutes), those capabilities defending our systems must be able 
to react incredibly quickly to prevent follow on attacks [6].  This is a defensive problem 
that the government must address, while adjusting to offensively fight and win in the new 
domain of cyberspace.  The existing literature highlights a strong set of cyber capabilities 
but a poor ability to communicate these to Joint combatant commanders [39].  Cyber Flag 
is a practical application of these capabilities that will require the commonality within the 
services in order to achieve success facing a credible cyberspace threat.  To fly and fight 
in Cyber Flag will require consistent doctrine, consistent joint definitions, and refined 
roles for warriors conducting operations in the cyberspace domain. 
While the Air Force begins organizing, training, and equipping a force for 
cyberspace operations, we face the fact that much of the expertise rests with civilians.  
However, this was equally true of the pioneering air domain as well, because most of the 
early air pioneers were civilian enthusiasts.  The ability to leverage the capability of 
computer hackers who are so often trying to penetrate government and civilian networks 
offers incredible potential in the initial realistic training environment (if nothing more 
than using these experts as training combatants).  Consider that during the early years of 
aviation some of the most respected pilots were those seen performing unimaginable 
aerial demonstrations as stunt pilots and barnstormers.  Regarded as renegades, these 
same pilots pushed aircraft capabilities and performance to their limits and as a result, 
names like Charles Lindbergh, are indelible in the history of aviation.  In many respects, 
hackers test our information systems in many of the same ways and are an invaluable 
resource as the Air Force and Defense Department seek the skills required to gain 
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 dominance in the cyberspace domain.  The capability to defend against the best computer 
hackers in the world will enable the military to leapfrog the civilian sector cyberspace 
capabilities in much the same way that the USAF now certainly dominates the air 
domain.  The overall goal is to develop a future shock and awe expertise providing strong 
deterrent to potential enemies and the assurance, if foolishly attacked, that decisive 
battlefield actions would minimize damage to US military and civilian personnel as well 
as their assets.  The most effective way to integrate this cutting edge expertise is by 
creating an environment that highlights, demonstrates, and improves the enabling 
capabilities of cyberspace.  This environment is Cyber Flag.   
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 IV.  Realistic Training Evolution 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. 
 
- Lord Wellington 
 
 
 
 
 
Desert Storm was won at the Nellis ranges and the US Army's National Training 
Center.  
 
- AFDD 2-1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I'd hate to see an epitaph on a fighter pilot's tombstone that says, ''I told you I 
needed training." . . . How do you train for the most dangerous game in the world 
by being as safe as possible? When you don't let a guy train because it's 
dangerous, you're saying, ''Go fight those lions with your bare hands in that 
arena, because we can't teach you to learn how to use a spear. If we do, you 
might cut your finger while you're learning." And that's just about the same as 
murder.  
 
- Colonel 'Boots' Boothby (First 64th Aggressor Squadron Commander) 
Cyber Flag is representative of the fields of Eton and the Nellis ranges for the 
looming cyberspace threat the United States, and indeed the civilized world, will 
inevitably face.  Realistic training exercises exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of war.  Broadly speaking, these levels of war utilize the Diplomatic, 
Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of power and exercises 
provide the necessary realism to prepare forces across this spectrum.   
The strategic level of war focuses on employing national power less by military 
and more through the D, I, E elements of DIME.  Strategic warfare is most commonly 
associated with the deterrent capabilities of nuclear weapons but increasingly cyberspace 
weapons are becoming the tools of choice [63: 2].  The operational level of warfare 
 
 focuses on fighting and winning a campaign (the M in DIME), while the tactical level 
consists of the force-on-force battles supporting the operational effort.  As an example, at 
the strategic level, the United States used diplomatic appeal through the United Nations, 
economic sanctions, and a robust media campaign (IO) to persuade Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait prior to the Gulf War in 1991.  When these efforts failed, the operational 
campaign, Desert Storm, used military might to force Iraq out of the region.  A series of 
tactical battles waged from the air, land, and sea supported the overall goal of this Desert 
Storm campaign.  
Training is an integral part of coordinating these strategic, operational, and 
tactical efforts during wartime.  War games are the training vehicle for strategic warfare 
[9:65].  Operational exercises focus on conducting campaigns through the assignment of 
missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.  Tactical exercises focus on the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) developed to employ weapon systems against 
an adversary.   
The following sections describe current realistic training in more detail while 
Table 4 summarizes the prominent exercises in which the Air Force participates.  
Appendix A provides a more comprehensive primer for military training exercises not 
covered in this chapter.  
Strategic Exercises 
The most prominent wargaming venues in the Air Force are Unified Engagement 
(UE) and Future Games (FG), also known as the Future Capabilities Game.  These 
exercises, held every two years, validate the future acquisition efforts of Joint and 
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 Coalition forces by using strategic moves and a credible military force structure to fight a 
conference room battle.  Both the red and blue teams brief their plan at the end of each 
day and the assessment cell evaluates the successes and failures associated with each 
move.  Future Games 07, held at the Air Force Wargaming Institute at Maxwell AFB, AL 
on 14-19 Oct 07, was the first exercise to highlight the increasing role of Information 
Operations at the strategic level of war.  This game utilized forces operating in 
cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.  This validated the 
conclusions of a 1998 RAND study highlighting the increasing asymmetric effects of 
Information Warfare at the strategic level of war [63].   
 Operational Exercises 
The Blue Flag and Terminal Fury exercises are prime examples of operational 
exercises.  The Tactical Air Command developed the Blue Flag exercise in 1977 to 
provide realistic training to Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) staff members 
[50].  The CAOC is a complex and unique weapons system and as such requires great 
proficiency from those who operate it.  The Blue Flag CAOC controls mostly simulated 
assets with the information systems seldom attacked, prompting organizers to incorporate 
more live fly participants and an increasing number of network intrusions by trained 
information aggressors.  Terminal Fury is a US Pacific Command exercise, which began 
in October of 2002 to test the contingency response of the Joint Task Force 519 [55].  
This is an operational-level planning exercise similar to Blue Flag but encompassing joint 
and coalition partners.   
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 Table 4 Prominent Training Exercises 
Exercise Location Focus Level Off/Def Agency 
Unified 
Engagement 
PACAF 
HQ 
Future 
acquisitions 
(10 years) 
Strategic Off HAF/A5XS 
Future Games AFWI Future 
acquisitions 
(20 years) 
Strategic Off HAF/A8X 
Red Flag  Nellis 
AFB and 
Eielson 
AFB 
Large force 
fam. (first 
10 missions)
Tactical Off 414 CTS and 
353 CTS 
Green Flag 
(East and 
West) 
Nellis 
AFB and 
Barksdale 
AFB 
CAS 
integration 
with Army 
Tactical Off 549 CTS and 
548 CTS 
Blue Flag Hurlburt 
AFB 
 
CAOC Staff Operational Def 505 CTS 
Virtual Flag Kirtland 
AFB  
C2 Operational Off 705 CTS 
DMOC 
Black Demon Barksdale 
AFB 
AF C2 
processes 
Tactical Def 23 IOS 
Bulwark 
Defender 
Barksdale 
AFB 
Joint C2 
processes 
Tactical Def STRATCOM 
JEFX Nellis 
AFB 
Research 
and devel. 
Operational 
and Tactical 
Off AWFC 
Terminal Fury Hawaii 
and Japan 
Joint Task 
Force 
training and 
integration 
Operational Off JTF 519 
Mission 
Employment 
Nellis 
AFB 
Large Force 
planning 
and empl. 
Tactical Off USAFWS 
Maple Flag Cold 
Lake, CA 
Large force 
fam. 
Tactical Off CAF 4th 
Wing 
Northern 
Edge 
Alaska Homeland 
Defense 
Operational/ 
Tactical 
Off/Def Alaska 
Command 
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 These exercises provide unparalleled training for operational planners.  Blue Flag, 
however, has logically avoided large-scale integration with offensive and defensive 
cyberspace operations due to the potential conflicts with existing core training; in 
particular, the generation of the Air Tasking Order (ATO).  A computer network attack 
that prevents generation of an ATO would result in a conflict with the critical training 
associated with the objectives of Blue Flag.    
Tactical Exercises 
The focus of tactical exercises is the force-on-force application of military power 
with Red Flag being the most prominent example.  The CSAF approved the Red Flag 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) on 15 July 1975 and the first exercise began on 27 
November 1975 [15].  For over 30 years, aircrew members have faced the tactical 
challenges of Red Flag played out on the 1,000 square-mile Nevada Test and Training 
Range (NTTR).  Crews plan and execute day and night missions often employing live 
munitions against realistic targets while facing aggressor aircraft and simulated surface-
to-air missiles.  The success of Red Flag resulted in the creation of similar tactical 
exercises to provide realistic training in other critical areas.  Cope Thunder, Maple Flag, 
and Air Warrior provided realistic training for integrated strike packages conducting both 
interdiction and Close Air Support (CAS) missions.  These realistic training venues 
created an incredible leap in pilot proficiency and lethality.  As is reflected in AFDD 2-1, 
“Desert Storm was won at the Nellis ranges and the US Army’s National Training 
Center” [9]. 
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 Red Flag has also given rise to realistic tactical training in computer network 
defense.  In 2000, the 23rd Information Operations Squadron (IOS) conducted the first 
Black Demon exercise [52].  This exercise brought a Red Flag flavor to the Computer 
Network Defense (CND) environment.  Black Demon used both live and simulated 
networks to focus on the defense of the entire Air Force network hierarchy [52].  The 
simulated network provided the capability for more realistic attacks while the live play 
enabled testing and training of the communication capabilities from the lowest level 
Network Control Center (NCC), through the Network Operations Security Center 
(NOSC) for each major command, up to the Air Force Network Operations Security 
Center (AFNOSC).  This exercise quickly gained credibility and gave rise to a joint 
exercise called Bulwark Defender in 2006. 
 The Air Force coordinated the Bulwark Defender exercise in 2006 under the 
guidance of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the Joint Staff [53].  The exercise challenges 
network operations supporting the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines under one Joint 
umbrella.  This exercise has become the annual Joint Information Assurance (IA) / CND 
capstone event, allowing collaboration within the DoD and civilian sector on the best 
methods for protecting the Global Information Grid (GIG) [53].  Regarding the success of 
this event, Col Gary McAlum, Director of Operations for Joint Task Force- Global 
Network Operations stated: 
"This was an excellent opportunity to exercise strategic-level NetOps tactics, 
techniques and procedures with a tactical context.  Bulwark Defender emphasized 
the necessity for near-real-time collaboration in dealing with incidents at base 
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 level that can quickly have implications across the global information grid. Old 
stove-pipe reporting processes just don't cut it in this battlespace.” [53] 
 
This quotation highlights the reality that cyberspace effects encompass all levels 
of war, strategic, operational, and tactical.  Although Bulwark Defender is a tactical 
exercise, it allows participants to realize the global effects enabled through cyberspace.  
Network operators see and understand these effects.  The difficulty is now illuminating 
the rest of the Air Force and Department of Defense as to these challenges and 
opportunities. 
Combined Exercises 
 Increasingly, the Red Flag and Northern Edge exercises combine the operational 
and tactical aspects of warfare.  In these exercises, the ATO generated by the CAOC 
dictates the tactical objectives of each day’s missions thus bridging the operational and 
tactical boundaries.  As a result, these exercises provide the most realistic representation 
of how Joint and Coalition forces fight wars.  Those participating in these exercises find 
how complex modern warfare is and how dependent we are on information.  The 
information supporting Red Flag and Northern Edge is trusted implicitly for a number of 
reasons, most notably safety.  The reality is, however, that it is unlikely this level of trust 
in information will exist in real war.  
 The Black Demon and Bulwark Defender exercises focus on the hands-on tactical 
defense of networks supporting the CAOC and the operational planning effort as a whole.  
Computer networks are constantly under attack and network operators attempt to mitigate 
this onslaught.  A significant limitation, however, is that the information flowing on these 
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 networks does not currently translate to offensive tactical employment in air, space, or 
cyberspace, however.  In other words, the ATO and associated planning products 
produced by the CAOC during these exercises do not put weapons on targets.  The reason 
for this is understandable; the Bulwark Defender and Black Demon exercises train 
warriors to defend critical information networks and accomplish this task very well.  This 
does highlight the fact, however, that there is no current venue combining operational 
planning with putting weapons on target in a hostile cyberspace environment.  These 
weapons are not just bombs and, as discussed previously, offensive cyberspace 
capabilities employed at the tactical level can have strategic effects on par with our 
nuclear arsenal. 
 Evolution of IO training 
The exercises described above all have specific objectives but none of them 
provides the capability to demonstrate the dominant and comprehensive effects capable 
through cyberspace envisioned in and by Cyber Flag.    
41 
 
 V.  Information Operations Planning 
 
 
IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war and 
across the range of military operations. 
 
- JP 3-13
As described in the previous chapters, the addition of cyberspace to the USAF 
Mission Statement marks the recognition of a new dimension in war fighting [1].  This 
comes on the heels of two other revolutionary concepts: Net Centric Warfare (NCW) and 
Effects Based Operations (EBO).  One reality of the current transformation of war 
fighting is the movement from an attrition-based to an effects-based mindset with 
cyberspace as a key medium.  The NCW construct is central to this metamorphosis in that 
everything from our battlefield weapon systems to each individual decision maker 
comprise a network node with linkages enabled through cyberspace.  The scale of these 
networks varies widely depending on whether we are executing a contingency-level 
operation, Irregular Warfare (IW), or a Major Combat Operation (MCO) against a nation-
state-level adversary [2].  A second reality is that cyberspace is itself a domain that 
enables the realization of significant combat effects; a truth clearly understood by those 
engaging in asymmetric terrorist operations.  The cyberspace domain is the haven for 
terrorists using the electromagnetic spectrum (primarily the Internet and cell phones) as 
an enabling medium to launch asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies.  
For this reason, IW has become the near-term focus of military efforts as the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review highlights [4].  Cyberspace affects all activities within IW 
and MCO.  Fundamental to the transformation from attrition-based to effects-based 
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 employment is the change in the way we train.  An environment encompassing kinetic 
and non-kinetic effects allows EBO to become the model for fighting wars.  This 
transformation must also include scenarios incorporating the near-term realities of 
Irregular Warfare with the future inevitability of Major Combat Operations. 
The Cyberspace Battlefield 
If the warfighting domain consists of coordinated systems (net-centric), then 
outcomes depend on either severing the links between those systems (network nodes) or 
affecting the nodes themselves.  Achieving control in all mediums linking these nodes 
(air, space, and cyberspace) encompasses a broad range of tasks (effectors) that support 
EBO.  As an example, dropping a bomb on a network node achieves similar results 
through the air medium that a denial of service attack on that same node accomplishes 
through cyberspace.  The Cyberspace Primer at Appendix B provides additional insight 
into characterizing these linkages by using models.    
One of the most effective cyberspace effects (which is largely absent from kinetic 
employment) is the impact of interference resulting in a distrust of critical systems and 
information.  Currently, information is generally trusted (by US forces), almost 
implicitly, but achieving distrust is relatively simple using any numbers of Computer 
Network Attack (CNA) methods.  Consider the following example, which highlights the 
significant operational impact resulting from an underlying distrust of the data feeding a 
network.   
The Combined Air Operations Center, which produces the ATO for Red Flag, 
uses an intranet to link the many computers coordinating the operational planning effort.  
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 This network contains several ties to the outside world in order to enable access to the 
Internet and Global Information Grid.  Using a relatively low level of sophistication, with 
no long-term damage, an adversary could penetrate the network and cause various 
computers to display the adversary nation’s flag as the desktop background and screen 
saver.  In itself, this action is benign but requires access to the computer file system that, 
if achieved, would also allow theft or modification of data that users would not likely 
ever know about.  The result can and should be a loss of confidence in the data and 
information on the affected machines and the network as a whole.  The reaction of the 
commander would likely range from a simple incident response and forensic analysis to 
momentary termination of planning activities.  Although the primary effect is to delay 
ATO production, there would be a strong possibility of rippling effects in the targeting 
cycle.   This is just one of multiple possible scenarios that require training to ensure 
adequate preparation during an actual crisis.   
 
Figure 2 Trust Compromise 
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 Training Gaps 
Currently, a training gap exists in showing exercise participants how the analysis 
of effects and consequences within all domains link directly to the military objectives.  
For example, to conserve weapons during training, aircrews often drop BDU-33s (25-
pound inert training munitions) on the designated target while simulating a much larger 
conventional combat load.  By comparison, we can demonstrate compromise in the trust 
of a system or network by simply modifying the background display of an AOC as 
described above.  This would effectively simulate a broader virus insertion that could 
destroy the data on each machine encountered.   
Another gap in the training environment is the lack of network diversity.  As 
discussed previously, IP networks form the foundation of our nation’s information 
infrastructure.  It is, therefore, critical that expertise in IP networks remain the core 
knowledge base for those responsible for defending US civilian and military systems.  
However, the cyber battlefield is not limited to IP-based networks.  In fact, the current 
definition of cyberspace extends beyond networks encompassing the broader areas of 
electronic warfare (EW) and Space Control, as well as Command and Control systems 
and Network Warfare [7].  
Achieving Cyberspace Superiority 
Recent conventional operations, such as Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom and Allied 
Force, depended on air superiority.  By definition, air-superiority “enables friendly forces 
to use the air medium for military purposes while denying the enemy effective use of the 
same” [9:2].   A very clear and critical future objective must be superiority that “enables 
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 friendly forces to use the digital medium for military purposes while denying the enemy 
effective use of the same” [9:2].  Just as General “Hap” Arnold saw the key role that the 
airplane would play in the next major conflict, so must leaders today see the role of the 
computer or other devices capable of achieving effects in cyberspace (inhibiting or 
modifying data and information).   
Defining Target Sets in Cyberspace 
A target set is the subset of available targets, which, if destroyed, achieve the 
desired effect.  An initial question we must address and answer is how do we define 
target sets in cyberspace?  This is a very crucial element of fighting the war within this 
new domain, yet there is very little existing guidance on the topic.  The joint doctrine 
guidelines dictate that an IO Cell (Figure 3) or planning organization be a component of 
the overall war planning effort in evaluating battlefield targets [7].  A similar 
understanding exists within the Air Operations Center (AOC) for planning Air Force 
missions.  In addition, “the Joint Force Commander should tailor the composition of the 
cell as necessary to accomplish the mission” [7]. 
The J-2T component of the cell represents the targeting team residing under the J-
2 (Intelligence) arm of the Joint Operations Center [7].  This targeting team is responsible 
for developing target sets that meet the Joint Force Commander’s intent in accordance 
with the Joint Targeting Cycle (Figure 4).  The Joint Prioritized Integrated Target List 
prioritizes these targets and the planning cell then assigns them to a specific day’s 
mission via the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) [32].   
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Figure 3 Information Operations Cell [7] 
The ITO designates specific details as to the means of destruction for each of the 
targets (platform and weapon).   
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Figure 4 Joint Targeting Cycle [32] 
 
 This is a very complicated process, involving a multitude of factors, and there is 
very little guidance to aid the planner within the Air Force or Joint Community.  The 
Joint Staff drafted the Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (JIOPH) in 
2003 to provide the necessary guidance to the J-2T on how to target IO threats [33].  
While this document does provide greater fidelity, it fails to provide adequate guidance 
for target selection.  Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Support to 
Targeting (Joint Pub 2-01.1) also attempts to provide clearer guidance for IO planning 
but succumbs to the same shortfalls as JIOPH [32].  Narrowing the field, by separating 
the most critical component of the IO battlefield (Computer Network Operations), is an 
essential starting point in defining an effective planning process.  Cyber Flag enables this 
capability by allowing the targeting of critical routers and communications nodes with the 
resulting effects directly tied to the exercise objectives.   
Cyberspace Weaponry 
An effective Cyberspace strategy must also include a credible and effective 
method of selecting the appropriate weapon to neutralize or destroy a cyberspace target.  
These weapons and tactics can range from conventional kinetic weapons to the 
unconventional virus infiltration of an enemy’s command and control network.  The 
USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide defines the term “weaponeering” as “the process 
used to effect the desired destruction on a specific target” [34].  The following are critical 
elements of the weaponeering process for conventional weapons directly applied to 
cyberspace targets [34]: 
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 1) Establish the damage criteria (e.g., permanent destruction versus temporary 
incapacitation) 
2) Determine available weapons and their effectiveness  
3) Determine aim points and desired impact points 
4) Evaluate weapon effectiveness post attack 
 These targeting guidelines do not currently exist in the IO arena and this is likely 
the reason why warfighting commanders seldom turn to the IO Cell to eliminate targets.  
The importance of IO (not cyberspace) is found in all current joint doctrine but specifics 
on how to employ this capability are largely absent throughout.   
An effective offensive cyberspace strategy requires weaponeering criteria.  Once 
accomplished, intelligence-gathering activities on network configurations and 
vulnerabilities will predict weapon effectiveness and enable probabilistic battle damage 
assessment.  Mapping and studying enemy network configurations, just as we do physical 
structures, identifies key vulnerabilities.  Once known, we can then predict the effect of a 
particular cyber weapon.  This defines the planning process for conventional attacks and 
there is a direct correlation to cyber targeting.  The destruction of computer network 
architectures with a cyber weapon is analogous to penetrating and destroying multi-story 
hardened bunkers with laser-guided munitions.  As such, we must extrapolate tools like 
the Joint Munitions Effects Manual, to cyber weapon employment [34].  This would 
allow mapping of Integrated Tasking Order targets to cyber weapons providing the 
critical link required in the kill chain.  The IO Cell can communicate cyber weapon 
capabilities by using much more familiar conventional weapon comparisons.    
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 Assessment 
After the completion of an attack, battle damage assessment (BDA) analyzes 
planned effects compared to the actual outcomes.  The criteria outlined in the J-2 
targeting guidance describe the following critical areas in evaluating IO weapon 
effectiveness [34]: 
1) Corruption 
2) Deception 
3) Delay 
4) Denial 
5) Disruption 
6) Degradation 
7) Destruction 
These areas are currently more challenging to evaluate in the CNO arena because, 
some say, a deterministic process may not be possible or practical, but in any case, the 
expertise in this area has not been developed [34].  For example, how do we really know 
we have disabled a targeted computer if we do not have physical access to it?  As such, 
there must be a probabilistic model to convey the results of a network attack.  The 
necessity to use a predictive process in evaluating attack success has given rise to the 
development of Effects Based Operations (EBO) which provide a means to “anticipate 
direct and indirect effects of a specific action” [35].  This concept uses modeling to 
predict the outcome of a specific attack and will undoubtedly play a necessary and 
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 integral part in convincing commanders that cyber weapons are a viable (and often the 
best) choice in destroying critical targets.   
Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell faced numerous obstacles when attempting to 
convince military leaders that aviation would define the outcome of future wars; many of 
the same struggles exist today in the cyberspace arena.  There is a decisive need for a 
refined plan to weaponeer information technologies.  With China representing the 
baseline threat, the United States must establish a concrete cyberspace employment plan 
including target sets, “weaponeering,” and employment standards all rigorously tested 
through Cyber Flag.   
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 VI.  Research Methodology 
 
 
  
 
 
In the development of air power, one has to look ahead and not backward and 
figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has happened. 
  
- Brigadier General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell
 
This chapter describes the research methodology, data collection and analysis for 
the development of an effective, efficient, and realistic cyberspace-training paradigm.  
This research centers on the case study design methods outlined by Robert Yin [69].  Yin 
defines six sources of evidence in support of case studies [69:30]: 
• Documentation  
• Archival Records  
• Interviews (primary source for this research due to the scarcity of literature)  
• Direct Observations  
• Participant-Observations  
• Physical 
Using these evidence sources and the Theory-Building methodology of Yin 
[69:54], the first six chapters outline a historical analysis of realistic training exercises 
and the evolution of employment within the cyberspace domain.  Chapter VII outlines the 
integration of the cyberspace elements into existing training venues based on this same 
analysis. 
In addition to historical analysis, this researcher conducted a series of data 
collection interviews between August 2006 and August 2007 (Table 5).   
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 Table 5 Visited Organizations 
ORGANIZATION LOCATION POC 
AFRL/HE Mesa, AZ Dr Dee Andrews 
AFRL/HEX Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Capt Larry Fortson 
HAF/A8X Pentagon Group Captain Gibson 
AWFC/CC Nellis AFB, NV MajGen R. Michael Warden 
57 ATG Nellis AFB, NV Col David Stilwell 
57 IAS Nellis AFB, NV LtCol Reb Butler 
57 IAS Nellis AFB, NV LtCol Robin Williams 
57 IAS Nellis AFB, NV Capt Kristin Steinke 
57 IAS Nellis AFB, NV Capt Josh Benson 
57 IAS Nellis AFB, NV Capt Chris Evans 
64 AGRS Nellis AFB, NV LtCol Greg Marzolf 
65 AGRS Nellis AFB, NV LtCol Larry Bruce 
18 AGRS Eielson AFB, AK LtCol Patrick Welch 
343 OG Eielson AFB, AK Col Mark Moore 
AFIOC, Det 2 Nellis AFB, NV Mr Jim Hird 
AFRL/HEAS Mesa, AZ Dr Joe Weeks 
NASIC/ADEA Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr Kieth Bobick 
NASIC/ADCC Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr Karl Harvey 
NASIC/ACDI Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr Craig Johnson 
33 IAS Lackland AFB, TX LtCol Mike Harasimowicz 
AWC/CSAT Maxwell AFB, AL LtCol Steve Moscarelli 
8AF/A3 Barksdale AFB, LA LtCol Dave Fahrenkrug 
8AF/A3 Barksdale AFB, LA Major Tim Franz 
8AF/CV Barksdale AFB, LA MajGen John W. Maluda 
67 NWW  Lackland AFB, TX Mr John Dougherty 
ASC/XRA Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr Tim Menke 
ASC/XRA Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr John Silance 
AFRL/SNZW Wright-Patterson AFB, OH Mr Mike Foster 
Booz Allen Hamilton Lackland AFB, TX Dr Mark Kanko 
67 OSS Lackland AFB, TX LtCol Paul Harrington 
USSTRATCOM/JFCC-GSI Tinker AFB, OK Major Chris Fogle 
353 CTS Eielson AFB, AK LtCol Brett Pauer 
HAF Washington, DC MajGen Charles V. Ickes II 
AFRL/RI Rome, NY Dr Kamal Jabbour 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Boston, MA Dr Rob Cunningham 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Boston, MA Mr Lee Rossey 
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 These interviews targeted agencies that are integrating IO into training and test 
environments.  Most dialogues involved the presentation of research methodology as well 
as a formal interview.  Due to the immaturity of cyberspace as a fully developed Air 
Force mission area, the interviews proved to be the most valuable source of data. 
Trip Reports 
 June-August 2007; Air Force Research Lab, National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:   The data collection 
process started at Wright-Patterson AFB with visits to several agencies conducting 
research and development of technologies supporting warfare within cyberspace.  
Captain Larry Fortson is leading the efforts of the Air Force Research Lab’s Human 
Effectiveness Division in developing concepts and technologies that will ultimately 
improve capabilities in cyberspace.   
Mr. Mike Foster is the director of the Virtual Combat Lab (VCL) within the 
Sensors Directorate of AFRL.  The VCL provides an incredible capability to test 
electronic warfare and network attack tools against realistic threats.  The VCL develops 
and improves capabilities used by Mr Tim Menke at the Aeronautical Systems Center to 
validate procurement decisions for the Air Force.  The VCL also supports threat 
exploitation efforts conducted by Mr Keith Bobick and Mr Karl Harvey at the National 
Air and Space Intelligence Center.   
 June-October 2007; Future Games 2007, Chantilly, VA and Maxwell AFB, AL:  
Participation in the Future Games 2007 exercise proved the most fruitful series of trips 
because of the topic evaluated and, more importantly, the people involved.  Through 
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 three planning conferences and the game itself, this researcher was able to talk with some 
of the key participants in the development of Cyber Command, including LtCol 
Fahrenkrug (8th Air Force) and LtCol Harasimowicz (33rd IAS).  These individuals 
provided key insight into the integration efforts of LtGen Elder and the 8th Air Force 
staff as well as key issues in the standup of Cyber Command.  In addition, FG 07 enabled 
an audience with MajGen Warden (AWFC/CC) and Col Stilwell (ATG/CC).  This was 
critical, in that, these individuals are responsible for the advancement of existing realistic 
training in the form of Red Flag, Virtual Flag, Green Flag, and Blue Flag. 
June 2007; Air Force Research Lab, Rome, NY:  A Cyber Defense Conference 
provided the perfect opportunity for this researcher to brief the focus of this thesis and to 
interact with individuals such as Dr Kamal Jabbour who have tremendous insight into the 
development of cyberspace capabilities and training.  Dr Jabbour expressed interest in the 
capability to use the Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism (Chapter IX) in 
training young Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets during a summer 
program he conducts. 
July 2007; Nellis AFB, NV:  The information gleaned from the personnel at Nellis 
AFB was invaluable to this researcher.  Mr Jim Hird heads the efforts of the Detachment 
2 of the Air Force Information Operations Command in integration IO into the Flag 
exercises under the Air Warfare Center.  Mr Hird provided insight into the efforts to 
develop Joint IO Range targets for Red Flag as well as visualization improvements to the 
Nellis Air Combat Tracking System.  Blue Flag will begin to encompass more 
cyberspace threats because of inputs and initiatives led by Mr Hird.  LtCol Reb Butler (57 
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 IAS/CC) and LtCol Robin Williams (57 IAS/DO) are the conduit between the cyber 
warriors and the flying community at Nellis.  They are bringing cyberspace into the 
mainstream at Nellis and have several efforts underway to integrate cyberspace effects 
into existing exercises, most notably Red Flag. 
September 2007; Red Flag-Alaska, Eielson AFB, AK:  The trip to Eielson AFB 
provided tremendous insight into the development of the Air Forces newest Flag venue.  
The interviews with Col Moore and LtCol Welch allowed this researcher a clear view of 
the differences between the existing Red Flag at Nellis AFB and Red Flag-Alaska.  
Eielson will not only provide training on par with Red Flag-Nellis, but also has 
tremendous potential to expand into areas, such as cyberspace, because it is a more 
isolated and focused environment.  Nellis supports a tremendous number of missions and 
events with Red Flag being only a minor part of the overall operation.  Eielson has the 
sole mission of supporting Red Flag, which enables tremendous potential for future 
training opportunities.    
October 2007; MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Boston, MA:  The trip to MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory focused on the potential of using the Lincoln Adaptable Real-time 
Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) to develop the Virtualized Intranet Platform 
for Exercise Realism (Chapter IX).  Dr Rob Cunningham and Mr Lee Rossey were a 
tremendous help in developing a game plan for integrating LARIAT into a portable 
network environment to support Cyber Flag.  
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 Military Decision Making Process 
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) provided this researcher a 
comprehensive framework of analysis to ensure the complete development of this 
research effort.   This process, used extensively by the Army, provides the following 
steps in dissecting a problem: 
1) Receipt of Mission 
2) Mission Analysis 
3) Course of Action (COA) Development 
4) COA Analysis 
5) COA Comparison 
6) COA Approval 
7) Orders Production 
8) Rehearsal 
9) Execution and Assessment 
This researcher utilized steps 3-6 of the MDMP process to develop three COAs 
associated with the research question: Is there a need for a dedicated Flag focused on 
the employment of capabilities within cyberspace?  As discussed previously, the 
research clearly and consistently showed the need for Cyber Flag and the following 
COAs are the suggested vehicles for this effort. 
1)  COA 1: The first option is to extend deployed forces for a one-week period 
after a Red Flag to support Cyber Flag.   
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 2)  COA 2:  An alternate option is to create a network infrastructure like Bulwark 
Defender with nodes at Air Force bases with aircraft.   
3)  COA 3:  The final option is to deploy forces for a dedicated Cyber Flag 
exercise in which the objectives support effects primarily focused on non-
kinetic means. 
Chapter VIII outlines and analyzes these COAs in accordance with steps 3-6 of 
the MDMP. 
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VII.  Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
“He who wants to protect everything protects nothing,” is one of the fundamental 
rules of defense. 
 
- General Adolf Galland
 
Every year there are new technological advances that provide more battlefield 
capabilities, but at ever increasing cost and complexity.  Capabilities like Blue Force 
Tracking (BFT) and Fighter Data Link (FDL) transmit invaluable information between 
troops and airplanes using computer data links.  A fighter pilot can instantly know who in 
his formation targeted an adversary, their weapons status, fuel state and other key 
concerns without even keying the radio microphone.  Before FDL, pilots were lucky to 
communicate even a fraction of this information using radio transmissions over the 
constant radio chatter inherent to any moderately sized air operation.  The same is true for 
the capabilities that BFT brings to troops in the field.  Soldiers can determine instantly 
where members of their unit are despite darkness, terrain, weather, or distance.  The 
enabling capabilities of BFT and FDL bring with them an inherent vulnerability.  If data 
flowing through these networks is compromised or inhibited, operations will likely 
terminate at least temporarily because of the dependence on the information.  Cyberspace 
enables the capabilities of FDL and BFT.  Nevertheless, offensive action in this domain 
can just as easily take this ability away.  As the realization of the significance of 
cyberspace begins to move into and through the senior Air Force leadership, there are 
increasing efforts to integrate these types of vulnerabilities into existing exercises.  
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 Strategic Exercises 
 This researcher recently participated in Future Capabilities Games 07 at Maxwell 
AFB as lead planner for Red Team Cyberspace Operations.  The Air Force Wargaming 
Institute hosted the six-day exercise on 14-19 October 2007.  This was the first time in 
the game’s eight-year history that cyberspace and information operations played a role.  
The Future Game exercise is a USAF Chief of Staff sponsored event, acting as a vehicle 
to guide future Air Force acquisition efforts (2027).  The classification level of the game 
required the omission of the explicit results from this thesis.  However, generically 
speaking, cyberspace operations played a crucial role in how the war played out.  The 
significance of this fact cannot be over-emphasized.  LtGen Robert J. “Bob” Elder, 8th 
Air Force commander and leader of the FG 07 Blue Team, eloquently communicated the 
increasing role that cyberspace must play in acquisitions decisions during his 19 October 
2007 out-brief to Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF Vice Chief of Staff.  This integration of 
cyberspace operations into Future Games is a seemingly insignificant event but 
represents the start of a much broader effort to bring cyberspace into the forefront of 
military thought.    
Operational Exercises 
“The start of the exercise accurately portrayed the ‘chaos of war’ as an early 
morning lightning bolt actually struck a building near the operations center just 
as players and controllers prepared to start the air campaign.  Power and 
communications were temporarily disrupted as technicians brought backup power 
online and re-established network connections to controllers here.  Within an 
hour, operations were restored and the simulated campaign continued.” [70] 
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 This excerpt from the 2005 Blue Flag exercise could just as easily been the result 
of a computer network attack.  Detachment 2 of the Air Force Information Operations 
Center (AFIOC) is responsible for integrating IO into the Air Warfare Center exercises, 
including Red Flag, Virtual Flag, and Blue Flag.  In an interview with Mr Jim Hird, 
AFIOC Detachment 2, this researcher learned about many of the efforts underway to 
integrate cyberspace effects into operational exercises.  The role of network attack and 
defense is increasing within Blue Flag.  Exercise coordinators throttle this activity, 
however, to avoid conflict with the traditional exercise objectives, namely training those 
who operate the CAOC.  As a result, these future IO integration efforts will likely fall 
short in achieving the effects through cyberspace that challenge exercise participants as 
much as natural conditions have previously done.  A dedicated Cyber Flag exercise 
would prevent this from occurring. 
Tactical Exercises 
The boldest move toward integrating cyberspace operations into tactical training 
was the 30 January 2007 activation of the 57th Information Aggressor Squadron (IAS) 
under LtCol Reb Butler at Nellis AFB.  The 57th IAS falls under the 57th Adversary 
Tactics Group (ATG) and is responsible for providing accurate threat replication of the 
cyberspace threat to tactical training audiences.  By working closely with AFIOC 
Detachment 2, this squadron has made significant strides in the traditionally fighter 
aircraft dominated venues of the Air Warfare Center, most notably Red Flag.  While there 
have been successes in the effort to present offensive cyberspace effects to the Red Flag 
audience, there are still significant challenges.  As should be the case, there are limited 
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 possibilities of demonstrating cyberspace effects without conflicting with the critical 
training that has been the vital focus of Red Flag for over 30 years.  The primary 
drawback of integrating sophisticated information operations weapons, and other like 
capabilities, is that threats are often limited or removed from the Red Flag scenario that 
are critical to training young aircrew members.  As discussed previously, Red Flag 
provides one of the few environments where aircrew can experience a robust surface-to-
air missile threat.  The White force personnel (responsible for administering the exercise) 
provide an insignificant subset of targets to non-kinetic capabilities so that their impact 
does not adversely affect the training of the participants.  Plans are in place for wider use 
of the Joint IO range to increase targets for network attackers.  Cyber Flag could be the 
ultimate answer to this critical objective by providing a robust set of credible cyberspace 
targets enabling the 57th IAS and information operations planners to exhibit the true 
capabilities of cyberspace to a Red Flag type audience.  Although Red Flag and Bulwark 
Defender still provide key realistic training to aircrew and network defenders, what is 
now required is the combination of Bulwark Defender and Red Flag into an exercise 
emphasizing cyberspace effects achieved both kinetically and non-kinetically.  The time 
is right for Cyber Flag!   
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VIII.  Cyber Flag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most important thing is to have a flexible approach. . . . The truth is no one 
knows exactly what air fighting will be like in the future. We can't say anything 
will stay as it is, but we also can't be certain the future will conform to particular 
theories, which so often, between the wars, have proved wrong.  
 
- Brigadier General Robin Olds
 
Red Flag has evolved in very positive ways from its inception.  Today, the 
exercise is less about training the young and inexperienced and more about large force 
employment in a robust threat environment.  Red Flag must not lose sight of the 
importance of training Airman at all experience levels to employ in a joint/coalition 
force. 
Our most likely adversary views the domain of cyberspace as the key to victory in 
future wars. Without our own parallel exercise venue, providing joint and coalition 
participants with a view into these enemy capabilities, development of adequate expertise 
and realistic training venues will continue at an unacceptably slow rate.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the integration of IO capabilities into existing realistic training must 
continue.  However, there should also be a dedicated exercise demonstrating offensive 
and defensive capabilities within air, space and cyberspace.  A new Flag, Cyber Flag, 
could accomplish this broad objective. 
Red Flag and Bulwark Defender independently provide key realistic training to 
aircrew and network operators but fall short in demonstrating cross-domain capabilities 
and effects.  We now need the combination of Bulwark Defender and Red Flag into an 
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 exercise, which emphasizes cyberspace effects, achieved both kinetically and non-
kinetically.  This Cyber Flag exercise would preserve the effectiveness of existing 
training venues while embracing the new domain of cyberspace, integrating capabilities 
drawn from across the services and coalition partners into one coherent effort.  Bulwark 
Defender is a key exercise of joint defensive capabilities within cyberspace.  Cyber Flag 
enables a training environment that integrates both offensive and defensive cyberspace 
effects into the mainstream operational and tactical planning effort.  A Joint Force 
Commander for Cyber Flag would have the capability to call on IO options or capabilities 
as readily as a bomb or other kinetic weapon.  
The development of such an environment is more palatable when divided into a 
three-year and 10-year vision, fully focused on maximizing exposure of participants to 
effects realized within cyberspace. 
Three-Year Vision: Best Practices and Realistic Scenarios 
A starting point for the establishment of Cyber Flag is to combine the best 
practices of existing training (both military and civilian) with the most realistic 
cyberspace threats and scenarios thus enabling a single exercise serving as a proof of 
concept for the future.  The center of the Nellis AFB Red Flag exercise is the Nevada 
Test and Training Range (NTTR), providing approximately 1,000 square miles for 
participating aircraft to maneuver against realistic air and ground threats.  Similarly, the 
center of cyberspace exercises is the Joint Information Operations Range, which provides 
an isolated network of geographically separated nodes capable of emulating a large 
number of real-world network topologies.  The Joint IO range isolates cyberspace effects 
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 from the public Internet while protecting tactics, techniques, and procedures from 
observation by potential adversaries.  In addition, this range protects training events from 
external influences, thus providing a perfect foundation for the Bulwark Defender 
exercise.  Similarities between the NTTR and Joint IO range environments, as well as the 
objectives of the Bulwark Defender and Red Flag exercises, provide an excellent starting 
point for integration.  By adding the appropriate command and control infrastructure 
enabled by the Joint IO range, the defense of networks supporting a tactical exercise like 
Red Flag will become critical as aggressors attack them.  The operational-level 
communications infrastructure exists as part of Bulwark Defender but lacks ties to the 
tactical-level planning effort.  The objectives of Bulwark Defender are an important part 
of evaluating network defenses, however.  We can now take training to the next level by 
utilizing the information flowing on the network to achieve tactical objectives.  The 
fusion of the Bulwark Defender and Red Flag environments and scenarios, into a Cyber 
Flag exercise, allows aviators and network operators alike to see cyberspace effects 
played out in real-time.  Because Cyber Flag would emphasize cyberspace effects, there 
is no conflict with existing training as would be the case if a network attack affected Red 
Flag flying training.  Friendly network attack forces participating in Cyber Flag would 
play a critical role in attacking aggressor target arrays, also enabled by the Joint IO range.  
Vital to creating realistic cyberspace targets is the ability to replicate threat systems on 
the IO range which, when incorporated with the physical Cyber Flag target array on the 
NTTR, would create an integrated warfighting environment.  Cyber Flag scenarios and 
lessons learned would then adjust to incorporate this enhanced capability.  A technical 
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 solution, which will provide assistance in this effort, is the Virtualized Intranet Platform 
for Exercise Realism (VIPER), defined further in the next chapter. 
The visualization component of this integration will provide a significant 
challenge.  The Nellis Air Combat Tracking System (NACTS) is the window into the 
Red Flag battle, but is not oriented toward demonstrating battlefield effects beyond the 
conventional realm.  During post mission debriefings, the NACTS allows for repeated 
replay of the air war on huge screens so that the hundreds of participants have a true 
understanding of what transpired during the mission.  Skillful use of debriefing slides will 
initially compensate for a lack of cyberspace effects visualization but there must be a 
future vision for a more robust capability displaying the real-time effects of the air and 
cyberspace battle.  Until this type of capability exists, warriors will not fully realize the 
power of this new warfighting domain and how effects are the key to fighting and 
winning wars, rather than solely the attrition of target sets.   
10-Year Vision: Cutting Edge Dominance 
The next decade should focus on building Cyber Flag into a mainstream training 
exercise.  With even a small-scale proof-of-concept for Cyber Flag realized in the near-
term and a constantly improving visualization capability over the next several years, 
cutting edge dominance in cyberspace requires multiple large-scale annual events to 
maximize exposure to this critical training.  The Cyber Flag transformation is very 
similar to the changes that EW brought to wafighting efforts, spawning the Green Flag 
exercise as discussed in Chapter I.  The breadth and revolutionary nature of waging war 
in cyberspace extends beyond the goals and objectives of Red Flag and thus suggests the 
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 need for a parallel approach.  The realization of a cyber attack that brings all exercise 
operations to a halt would likely drive home the point that we are fighting a much 
different type of war.  The goal of this type of exercise would be to demonstrate offensive 
and defensive cyberspace capabilities.  This approach closely mirrors how the Chinese 
have trained since the late 90’s in their transformation from a “mechanized PLA force to 
an informationalized force” [14].  As Timothy L. Thomas states in the book Dragon 
Bytes: 
“In October 1999, the PLA conducted another IW exercise.  Two army groups of 
the Beijing Military Region conducted a confrontation campaign on the computer 
network.  Reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance, interference and counter 
interference, blocking and counter blocking, and air strikes and counter air 
strikes were practiced.  The Operations Department of the General Staff said this 
was the first time that a computer confrontation was conducted at the campaign 
level between a red army and blue army.  Actual field operations of a similar 
nature were conducted simultaneously in the Jinan Theater.  According to one 
observer, the performance of the high-tech weaponry was like that of a ‘tiger with 
wings.’  The force demonstrated new tactics of using live ammunition to hit enemy 
cruise missiles and computer technology to hit information networks, links and 
points.” [14] 
 
 This excerpt is from 1999, the training and capabilities of the PLA have likely 
improved a great deal, due in part, to such credible training.  Our future vision for 
realistic training should rise to meet this level of threat while breaking free of the 
geographic boundaries imposed by the current exercise arenas.   
Most people in the Air Force are familiar with the Phase II employment exercise 
environment, which simulates that a base is under attack.  Participation in a future Cyber 
Flag could have the same flavor, with a base required to launch attacks from home station 
while under attack from air, space, and cyberspace.  Building on this premise, by 2018 
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 the realistic training environment should involve a widely distributed war involving 
multiple bases, conventional ranges, and computer networks.  The continual growth of 
network and communication capabilities makes this a realistic prediction given the proper 
emphasis and planning.  Unlike the evaluation model of a Phase II exercise, this exercise 
would provide training to participants just as Red Flag has done for years.  What better 
test of training and preparation than an environment where operations are inhibited by e-
mail server compromises, degradation of mobile and public switched telephones (or their 
successors), as well as assaults by aggressor aircraft?  The Chinese see this type of 
training as the way to exercise kinetic and non-kinetic options by their informationalized 
force, as demonstrated in the above exercise report.  In order to provide dominance 
within air, space, and cyberspace the US must do the same.  The capability to experience 
such a robust combat environment at one’s home station is the ultimate goal of realistic 
training since it enables the maximum amount of training using the most realistic forces 
in the shortest amount of time at the least expense. 
Although it is difficult to even fathom what the world, much less the Air Force, 
will look like beyond the this 10-year vision, we must strive for a cyberspace capability 
equivalent to the shock and awe campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In order to 
accomplish this, there must be a continuing effort to keep pace with technology and bring 
the realities of the cyberspace battlefield into our everyday operations. 
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) 
Using the MDMP as outlined in Chapter VI, there are three viable Courses of 
Action for implementing the Cyber Flag exercise. 
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 COA 1: The first option is to extend deployed forces for one-week after a Red 
Flag to support Cyber Flag.  Table 6 provides a sample flow for the week.  As an 
example, participants would see a Thailand threat with capabilities focused on benign 
network scans searching for system vulnerabilities.  If Thailand has technology that 
allows for the search for vulnerabilities outside IP-based networks (such as closed 
battlefield or airborne linked systems) then scanning of these systems could take place as 
well.  If not patched, these vulnerabilities provide the foundation for attacks on networks 
during the future days of the exercise.  The goal would be for participants to recognize 
and counter this scanning activity if possible.  Offending network nodes and systems, if 
positively identified, could become potential targets for future day’s missions.      
In addition, the following the threat levels provide a graduated learning 
environment as follows: 
• Level I: Benign Target 
• Level II: Defended Target 
• Level III: Aggressive Target (i.e. shoots back) 
These threat and target types represent the focus for operational planning and 
tactical employment during the week of Cyber Flag.  The networks supporting the 
operational planning would be subject to the effects listed in Table 6, given the type of 
vulnerabilities that exist.  The CAOC would be under constant attack and ATO 
production must continue to fuel the tactical missions.  If it were impractical to have the 
Nellis CAOC attacked, then a notional CAOC tied to the Joint IO range would produce 
products in parallel with those used to fly actual missions.      
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 Table 6 Cyber Flag Scenario Matrix 
Day M Tu W Th F 
Threat  Thailand India Russia China China 
Level I II III III III 
Types C2 C2 & SCADA C2 & SCADA C2&Airborne All 
Vulnerability Patches Patches & 
Protocol 
Patches & 
Protocol 
Phishing, Virus 
Worm 
All 
Effect Scans 
(IPB) 
Scans & 
Hooks 
Web Page 
Deface, 
Anomalous 
Activity  
Data Extraction, 
DOS, EA 
All 
 
Mission planning could ensure target pairing to both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.   
Pros:  This option would preserve existing Red Flag training objectives 
accomplished during the previous week’s missions.  The cyberspace domain would be 
the emphasis of the additional week of training.  This is an optimal scenario because it 
allows a robust Air Expeditionary Force to employ against the most realistic threat while 
focusing on the enabling effects within cyberspace. 
 Cons:  Funding for unit deployments would have to be increased but costs 
compared to deploying and redeploying the necessary forces are minimal.    
COA 2:  A second option is to create a network infrastructure like Bulwark 
Defender with nodes at Air Force Bases that have aircraft.  Table 7 provides a suggested 
force structure and associated participants.  Aggressors would conduct network warfare 
against the operational command elements of the network while Blue Forces task aircraft 
to provide tactical support.     
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 Table 7 Distributed Cyber Flag Players 
Squadron Role Base 
1st Fighter Wing (F-15 / F-22) Offensive Counter Air / Red 
Air 
Langley AFB, VA 
ACC NOSC / INOSC Command and Control Langley AFB, VA 
2nd Bomb Wing (B-52) Interdiction / Strike Barksdale AFB, LA 
AFNOC Command and Control Barksdale AFB, LA 
8th AF CAOC Barksdale AFB, LA 
33 IOS Net-D Lackland AFB, TX 
315 IOS Net-A Ft George Mead, MD 
355th Wing (A-10) CAOC / CAS David Monthan, AZ 
SOCOM CAOC Hurlburt AFB, FL 
57 IAS Information Aggressors Nellis AFB, NV 
 
In addition, aggressors would implement elements of CNA, CND, PSYOPS and EW at 
the tactical level by targeting base-level communications infrastructure. 
 Pros:  This would be the lowest cost option for Cyber Flag because bases could 
support the exercise without the deployment of aircraft.  The aircraft could also fly 
alternate missions if the cyber effects prevented them from executing the primary tasking.  
A base-level exercise would also exhibit a broad range of cyber effects to a very diverse 
audience including communications, maintenance, aviation, and security police 
personnel.  Jamming could take place against cell phones and land mobile radios.  
Internet attacks could start with propaganda via web pages and phishing attacks aimed at 
gaining network access.  The escalation of the exercise could then see complete denial of 
service attacks against networks on base similar to an “Alarm Black” type event during a 
Phase II. 
 Cons: This would require base-level participation similar to a Phase II exercise.  
Nearly all base operations would cease except those supporting the exercise. 
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 COA 3:  The final option is to deploy forces for a dedicated Cyber Flag exercise 
in which the objectives support effects based primarily on non-kinetic means. 
 Pros: There is nothing better than a dedicated venue for highlighting the enabling 
capabilities of cyberspace.  The benefit of this COA over COA 1 is the emphasis on 
cyberspace.  If participants extend their stay after Red Flag to participate in Cyber Flag 
there is potential for a deemphasized approach.  This COA is the remedy for that 
problem. 
Cons: The lack of money available to spend on additional training or to upgrade 
existing training is a growing concern.  There will have to be a tremendous 
reprioritization of funding for training and programs to enable this type of Cyber Flag.  
This researcher recommends careful consideration of funding priorities based on the most 
likely threat and future warfighting environment. 
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IX.  Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism 
 
  
 
 
- Kevin Costner (Field of Dreams, 1989) 
If you build it, they will come. 
 
One of the most crucial elements in implementing the Cyber Flag CONOPS is to 
provide the capability to turn nodes of the Joint IO Range into either blue networks (for 
defense) or red networks representing blue target sets.  The idea behind the Virtualized 
Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism (VIPER) is that a portable network replication 
suite provides required capabilities at a minimal cost.  Remote access to VIPER, enabled 
through an IP-managed keyboard-video-mouse (KVM) switch, also reduces cost by 
minimizing the need for on-site maintenance personnel.   
 This chapter provides an overall outline for implementing a simulated network and 
traffic generation capability in support of Cyber Flag.  This environment uses the Lincoln 
Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) developed by Lincoln 
Laboratory.  The 346th Test Squadron at Lackland AFB, TX currently uses the LARIAT 
software suite successfully.  
Synopsis 
VIPER uses VMware and LARIAT to simulate up to three Air Force Base networks.  
The utility of this environment serves four key purposes: 
1) Provide an academic learning environment for the capabilities of the LARIAT 
network including: 
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 a. Traffic generation 
b. Network replication 
c. Internet simulation 
2) Hardening of networks constructed for other purposes within the academic 
environment at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 
a. The annual Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) can bridge to VIPER, testing 
usability and security. 
3) Development of VIPER can act as a target for offensive network activities.  The 
AFIT network attack classes can utilize VIPER for a more realistic representation 
of a target network. 
4) Finally, the VIPER provides a portable network replication node for integration 
with the JIOR.  This replication environment allows for defensive training on a 
base network or provides a target for network attacks. 
Hardware Requirements 
As mentioned previously, the 346th has demonstrated the practicality of the 
LARIAT environment.  This realism, coupled with portability, makes VIPER (depicted at 
Figure 5) an excellent building block network to support Cyber Flag.  Using 
virtualization technology, the ability to replicate hardware using software, VIPER 
provides a small-scale network with simulated users and acts as either a target of 
computer network attack or a defensive training platform.   
VIPER is self-contained and portable with the ability to connect to a larger 
training network like the Joint IO Range. The basis for the network replication is 
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 LARIAT [65].  The LARIAT software links virtualized Air Force Base networks with 
simulated users to provide a realistic environment for training in network attack or 
defense.  Table 8 summarizes the hardware costs associated with VIPER.  VMware 
Server 1.0.4 provides the virtual network framework including the appropriate operating 
system and network services.       
Table 8 VIPER Hardware Costs 
Component CPU RAM Hard Disk Cost 
Dell Power 
Edge 860 Server 
Dual 
Core 
2.4GHz 
4GB 80GB $2506.03(x5)
Laptop Dual 
Core 
1.5GHz 
2GB 250GB $999.00
Cables 10’ Cat-5 Patch Cable (x10) $104.30
Switch 12 Port Switch (CISCO 2950) $549.99
Router Cisco 2600 Single Interface Router $578.75
KVM Switch Avocent Autoview 1000R IP Managed KVM $2718.04
Case 8 Server Transportable Hard Case $1023.42
Optional Items Monitor, Keyboard, Mouse, 500GB External Hard 
Drive 
$500.00
Total  $19,003.65
        
The LARIAT package provides the capability to emulate user activity on the 
virtual Air Force Base networks. VIPER consists of five servers linked by a 12-port 
switch (Cisco Catalyst 2950) with an additional laptop connected for system management 
(Figure 5).  A single interface Cisco 2600 router allows routing within the network 
environment.  The five-server model provides large enough networks for training but 
scales to much more complex hardware configurations as required.  One Dell Power 
Edge 860 server hosts the LARIAT traffic generation server, providing traffic within and 
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 between each of the three AFB networks.  Another Dell server provides a simulated 
Internet environment including the ability to access popular web pages such as 
ESPN.com and CNN.com.   
Cyber Flag 
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Figure 5 Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism (VIPER) 
The traffic generator enables virtual users with accounts on each base network to 
access web pages, within each base and the simulated Internet, as well as the ability to 
send and receive e-mail.  The remaining three Dell servers support the virtualized Air 
Force Base networks.  Each of these base networks contains three clients, with multiple 
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 user accounts, and three servers, providing Active Directory, Domain Name, Exchange, 
and Internet Information Server services.  This architecture is very simplistic yet serves 
as a baseline proof of concept for a much larger physical and virtual network.  LARIAT 
can support a large number of operating systems and applications, making it relatively 
easy to expand to models that are more robust.  As an example, VIPER consists of 
Microsoft Windows based networks using Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2 for each 
server and Windows XP Service Pack 2 for the clients.  LARIAT supports the full range 
of Windows operating systems as well as most versions of LINUX.  In addition, VIPER 
initially supports Internet Explorer and Outlook Express applications but LARIAT allows 
virtual users to utilize a much broader range of applications such as the Firefox web 
browser and the full Microsoft Office suite.  If the LARIAT software supported more 
applications inherent to the CAOC, the result would be an even more robust network 
defense platform.   The physical servers can support approximately three virtual servers 
and up to four virtual clients based on 4GB of memory and 80GBs of disk storage, each 
Power Edge 860 has two 80GB mirrored hard drives.  Each virtual machine utilizes 
10GB of drive storage and roughly 500MB of memory.  By simply increasing the disk 
storage capacity and memory on the associated servers, much larger virtual network 
configurations are possible.  According to Lee Rossey, the lead developer for LARIAT, 
Lincoln Laboratory routinely runs 30 virtual machines on servers using machines with 
equivalent processor capacity to those supporting the VIPER model, 16GB of physical 
memory, and 350GB of hard disk storage.   
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 A laptop allows off-site system monitoring and control of VIPER using the 
Avocent KVM switch and the What’s Up Gold network mapping application (Figure 6 
and 7).   
 
Figure 6 Prototype VIPER Node 
Software Requirements 
The LARIAT software package provides a capability to both replicate Windows 
networks and to simulate user activity on those networks.  The LARIAT Tenets are [65]: 
1) Provide traffic modeling 
a. Emulate user actions and activities 
b. Configurable traffic patterns and flows 
2) Provide tools to assist operators in constructing a network attack range 
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 a. Automation of services 
b. Connectivity testing 
3) Provide tools to test situational awareness and analysis 
a. Monitor traffic and machine health 
In keeping with these objectives, LARIAT is constantly evolving based on user 
requirements and technological advances.  By their own testimony, the Lincoln Lab team 
is more than willing to add user models, applications, and other features to LARIAT that 
will expand its capability and user base.  With this in mind, the ability to provide a 
simulated CAOC for defensive training, or the enemy equivalent, is not beyond the scope 
of reality. 
 
Figure 7 VIPER Network Mapping 
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 Summary   
VIPER provides a robust learning environment for AFIT in addition to an 
expandable proof of concept for the Cyber Flag CONOPS.  The design of the system 
combines portability and cost efficiency to enable a building block for wide-scale 
integration on the JIOR.  In addition, the system can be remotely managed thus requiring 
low manpower for support and operation in the field.  All of these elements combine to 
allow widespread implementation immediately. 
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  X.   Results and Conclusions 
 
 
  
I would not give a fig for the simplicity this side of complexity, but I would give 
my right arm for the simplicity on the other side of complexity. 
  
- Oliver Wendell Holmes
 
 
The following key questions emerged during this research effort and the answers 
provided insight into the future course of realistic training.   
1)  How have the current Flags and Exercises evolved to address changing 
defensive threats and offensive opportunities largely driven by 
technological changes?  Chapter IV, Chapter VII, and Appendix A address 
the evolution of realistic training exercises at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war.  A constant theme in these efforts is the conflict 
between implementing new elements of exercises and the existing training 
objectives.  There have been several instances of new exercises, most notably 
Green Flag, generated with the sole purpose of maintaining current and 
necessary training objectives while highlighting a fundamental warfighting 
capability. 
2)  How do we visualize effects within cyberspace in conjunction with kinetic 
effects during the course of an exercise?  Chapter V, Chapter VIII, and 
Appendix B address the lack of visualization technology in-place today.  
There is significant work underway to enable a visualization capability but 
funding priority issues have limited this effort [40].  In addition, a lack of 
funding has delayed or cancelled many of the upgrades to the NTTR that will 
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 realistically reflect the battlefield of tomorrow.  The majority of the threats on 
the NTTR cannot replicate modern-day surface-to-air missile systems or the 
advanced command and control capabilities of our adversaries.  Funding has 
also limited the development of an effect-based visualization capability for 
Red Flag participants [40].  Without an environment that accurately reflects 
NCW, EBO, and cyberspace, the training effectiveness of the aggressors is 
diminished.  
3)  Who are the key threats operating within cyberspace and how are they 
training?  Chapter II fully addresses the broad range of threats that operate 
within cyberspace including terrorists, hackers, crackers, and nation-state 
actors.  Although China represents the baseline threat within cyberspace, 
based on their expertise and emphasis on Information Warfare, they are by no 
means the most likely adversary.  The capability to continue to refine the most 
capable and likely threats with the cyberspace domain is left as a significant 
challenge for the Intelligence community.  The capability to characterize 
current and future adversaries will be critical in the development of offensive 
and defensive cyberspace operations as well as realistic training. 
4)  How do we plan and coordinate information operations in conjunction 
with conventional operations to mitigate defensive threats and provide 
offensive opportunities within cyberspace?  Chapter V addresses current IO 
planning within cyberspace as well as future requirements for weaponized 
capabilities.  There are increasing efforts to integrate IO with conventional 
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 operations stemming from the activation of a Major Command focused on 
cyberspace and the accompanying force development effort.  With a refined 
cyberspace force, comes the inevitable guidance on the roles and missions 
associated with that force as well as a formal tasking process.  Once 
accomplished, a clear understanding of offensive opportunities in cyberspace 
can be established inside the USAF with eventual widespread use of those 
capabilities both within the Air Force and DoD.  
5)  What initiatives are underway to integrate cyberspace effects into existing 
Flags and exercises?  Chapter VII identifies current integration efforts.  The 
consistent theme identified in this chapter is the conflict that exists between 
current critical training objectives and the integration of cyberspace 
capabilities.  Cyber Flag provides a solution to this conflict, providing a 
realistic training environment in order to evaluate the threats and required 
capabilities within cyberspace.  
6)  Is there a need for a dedicated Flag focused on the employment of 
capabilities within cyberspace?  Chapter VIII provides an explanation for 
the need to develop a dedicated cyberspace exercise, Cyber Flag.  The fiscal 
and force structure limitations require tough choices between existing 
weapons and training programs and the much needed emphasis on cyberspace.  
Cyber Flag represents the most cost effective alternative to optimize existing 
resources while providing the required emphasis on the cyberspace mission 
area.   
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 Implications 
 This research provides an evolutionary approach to integrating cyberspace 
capabilities into existing exercises and defines a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 
Cyber Flag (Appendix C).  The intent is to provide guidance to existing Air Warfare 
Center and Air Combat Command staff members guiding the fundamental evolution of 
realistic cyberspace training. 
Results 
 The CONOPS for Cyber Flag was presented to the 57 ATG Commander, Col 
David Stilwell, who is charged with developing the way ahead for Red Flag for MajGen 
Warden the AWFC Commander.  Col Stillwell considered the Cyber Flag concept viable 
but funding limitations restrict implementation.  There should be a further discussion 
regarding the prioritization of funding based on current training objectives and the future 
threat. 
Conclusions 
The time is right for Cyber Flag given emerging technology, a pervasive threat, 
and the conflict with existing exercise objectives.  As is commonly understood, there is 
no better training than the hands-on realism associated with participation in an exercise 
such as Red Flag or Bulwark Defender.  Secretary Michael W. Wynne has a vision for 
dominant operations in cyberspace “comparable to the Air Force’s global, strategic 
omnipresence in air and space” [17]. This vision requires a combination of joint 
coordination, skilled forces and a realistic training environment to bring them all 
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 together.  Budget constraints and a failure to accept cyberspace as a decisive warfighting 
domain could put the United States military in a poor position against future enemies.  
Cyberspace increasingly stitches together the diplomatic, information, economic and 
military instruments of power.  The creation of a dedicated Cyber Flag exercise allows 
the preservation of critical learning objectives of current exercises while preparing forces 
to understand the important role of cyberspace in achieving battlefield success.  The 
United States military does not currently have an advantage in cyberspace and the future 
of our nation depends on the military’s ability to harness the best practices to achieve 
cutting-edge dominance and ultimately shock and awe within cyberspace. 
Future Research 
Given these results, the following areas require future research: 
1) Explore the utility of expanding the hardware and software capability of 
LARIAT to enhance the training environment.  Although the VIPER provides 
a starting point, the reality of technical advance makes this an iterative 
process. One example would be to upgrade the software capabilities of VIPER 
using VMware ESX.  There is a free academic license available for VMware 
ESX and future development of VIPER would benefit greatly from its use.  
The VMware ESX software acts as a host operating system as well as 
managing all of the virtual machines created.  This eliminates the memory and 
processor overhead associated with having VMware act through a host 
operating system (currently Windows Server 2003 for VIPER) which in-turn 
increases performance.  This researcher estimates double the number of 
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 virtual machines for each physical VIPER server with the use of VMware 
ESX. 
2) Conduct a broader look into service-level training requirements and provide 
recommendations on redundant training exercises.  These redundancies 
provide ways to both consolidate training and to free up funding for a 
dedicated Cyber Flag initiative.  
3) Develop scenarios for use with VIPER that will assist in the network attack 
and defense education and training process.  VIPER provides a robust 
capability to allow for both offensive and defensive training.  These scenarios 
would require trainees to shore up network defenses of VIPER to protect 
information from compromise.  In addition, mission planning and attacks on 
VIPER validate tactics, techniques, and procedures of those trained for 
network attack roles.  Phishing, keylogger, privilege escalation, and data 
mining are just some of the attacks realistically supported by VIPER.  The 
resilient nature of VIPER allows rapid rebuild and repeat of scenarios, 
maximizing training for all involved. 
4) There should be significant effort to enhance the capabilities of LARIAT for 
modeling of applications specific to the CAOC.  Such efforts will significantly 
enhance credibility and training realism.  Mr. Chris Connelly at Lincoln Labs 
is looking for assistance in developing these applications and this would be a 
very beneficial area for an AFIT student with CAOC experience to provide 
support. 
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 5) Although this research recommends three COAs, there must be consideration 
for what happens beyond this near term view.  Cyber Flag emphasizes 
cyberspace effects in order to jump start realistic training in this domain.  An 
eventual outcome of Cyber Flag would be that streamlining of kinetic and 
non-kinetic operations eliminates conflicts with other existing exercise 
objectives.  When this occurs, more cyberspace capabilities become part of 
exercises like Red Flag and Blue Flag until the need for Cyber Flag no longer 
exists.  This was the fate of Green Flag as discussed previously.  The 
development of a future vision that describes how Cyber Flag becomes an 
exercise that no longer just emphasizes cyberspace capabilities but more truly 
represents total war in all domains has significant utility in the mind of this 
researcher.     
Cyber Flag is just the beginning of a broader effort to integrate cyberspace 
operations into mainstream military planning and execution.  The VIPER is a building 
block for constructing a robust and comprehensive future training environment.  We must 
start somewhere and VIPER provides that initial low cost training alternative that will 
start the iterative process of building the most capable air, space, and cyberspace force in 
the world.   
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 Appendix A – Exercise Primer 
 
This appendix contains reference material from AFDD 2-1 and other sources 
defining realistic training for the Air Force. 
Red Flag 
The history of Red Flag dates back to the end of the Vietnam War.  Project Red 
Baron I and II were based on a series of studies including the evaluation of 400+ air-to-
air engagements in Southeast Asia starting in 1967 [62].  The goal was to identify the 
root causes for the low (2.5:1) enemy vs. US fighter aircraft kill ratio achieved in 
Vietnam compared to the 10:1 kill ratio in Korea.  In response to this analysis, the report 
highlighted the following [62, 8]: 
1) There was a lack of Air Combat Maneuver (ACM) training across Air Force 
fighter units.  Fighter crews lacked familiarity with enemy tactics and the 
maneuvers that could counter them. 
2) The first ten missions during combat operations were the most critical for 
survival.  Pilots with at least this number of sorties stood a significantly higher 
chance of survival. 
3) Crews trained primarily against one another during peacetime training 
missions and, therefore, were not prepared to identify and counter dissimilar 
aircraft.  As a result, nearly 80 percent of air-to-air losses were due to unseen 
adversaries.  The Vietnamese Mig-17s and 21s were nearly half the size of the 
F-4 and F-105 [19]. 
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 One of the primary outcomes of the Red Baron I and II Reports was the 
establishment of the Readiness through Realism initiative sponsored by Tactical Air 
Command [8].  This initiative resulted in the following training improvements: 
1) The Air Force generated four aggressor squadrons (64th, 65th, 527th and 
26th) flying the T-38 and then the F-5 to provide dissimilar training.  
2) In 1975, the Coronet Real program developed realistic target arrays and threat 
simulators [20]. 
3) The development of a robust suite of assessment tools, including optical 
scoring and SAM video debrief reconstruction using the Air Combat 
Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) aircraft tracking system. 
In addition, the specification of a Designed Operational Capability (DOC) [21] 
identified a primary and secondary mission for each squadron.  This allowed squadrons 
tasked primarily to do air-to-air to dedicate the majority of their training sorties to this 
purpose.  
The Birth of Red Flag 
In April of 1975, the Directorate of Operations, Headquarters Air Force, provided 
a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) briefing for an exercise called Red Flag to attendees 
of the Fighter Weapons Symposium [15].  The CONOPS encapsulated the Readiness 
through Realism mindset into a single exercise providing the most realistic training 
environment possible for aircrews [15].   This environment intended to replicate the first 
ten combat missions to increase aircrew survivability in real combat.  The Air Force 
Chief of Staff approved the concept on 15 July 1975 and the first Red Flag began on 27 
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 November 1975 [15].  Participants consistently praised Red Flag (with subsequent results 
substantiating their effectiveness), resulting in the creation of similar exercises to provide 
realistic training in other critical areas.   
Current Initiatives 
 The evolution of Red Flag over the past 30 years includes the addition of Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR), Dynamic Targeting (DT) and advanced Command, Control, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR).  Several changes over the past 
four years have further transformed Red Flag and its goal of cutting edge realistic 
training. 
Aggressors 
 While the USAF Aggressor program began in 1972 and eventually grew to four 
full squadrons of F-5s, 1990 started a cutback that relegated the program to a small 
number of F-16s primarily supporting Red Flag.  The Air Force Chief of Staff called for a 
resurgence of the Aggressors starting in 2003 with the 64th Aggressor Squadron 
reactivated in October 2003 with eleven F-16s and the 65th Aggressor Squadron 
activated in January of 2006 with seven F-15s at Nellis AFB [22].  In March of 2006, the 
Alaskan Cope Thunder exercise became Red Flag-Alaska with the traditional Red Flag 
designated Red Flag-Nellis.  The 18th Aggressor Squadron activated August of 2007 
with 22 F-16s at Eielson AFB to provide dedicated adversary support for Red Flag-
Alaska.  By providing two Red Flag venues, more units can be included in Red Flag in 
preparation for their respective Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments. 
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 57th Adversary Tactics Group 
 In June 2005 the 57th Adversary Tactics Group (ATG) activated at Nellis AFB 
becoming "Threat Central" for the Air Force [22].  The ATG added Space and 
Cyberspace Aggressors to the traditional air-breathing arsenal, bringing the 527th and 
26th Space Aggressor Squadrons under its umbrella.  In addition, a portion of the 92nd 
Information Aggressor Squadron (IAS) at Lackland AFB became the 57th IAS at Nellis 
AFB. 
Green Flag 
General Wilbur L. “Bill” Creech developed the Green Flag in 1978 to integrate 
the enabling capabilities of EW into realistic training.  This exercise focused on signal 
intelligence and offensive EW platforms to highlight the necessity of these capabilities in 
the presence of a robust surface-to-air missile environment.  These same capabilities are 
now a part of Red Flag and in 2006, the role of Green Flag dramatically changed.  The 
Green Flag exercise now tests the air support of Army troops conducting battlefield 
exercises at The National Training Center (NTC), at Fort Irwin, and the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk.  More specifically, Green Flag absorbed the 
exercise formerly known as Air Warrior I (now Green Flag-West) and Air Warrior II 
(now Green Flag-East) [49]. 
Blue Flag 
The Tactical Air Command developed the Blue Flag exercise in 1977 to provide 
realistic training to CAOC staff members [50].  The CAOC is a weapons system and as 
91 
 
 such requires great proficiency from those who operate it, as well as a dedicated Flag to 
provide a realistic training environment to develop this expertise.   
Virtual Flag 
The Virtual Flag exercise utilizes the ever-increasing capability of computer 
simulation to provide a realistic USAF training environment across the United States.  
The Distributed Mission Operations Center (DMOC) and the 705th Combat Training 
Squadron host this exercise [51].  
“Think of Virtual Flag as a huge simulation in which our aircrews, space 
warriors and ground operators in the Air Operations Center, Control Reporting 
Center and Patriot missile batteries ‘fight’ the enemy completely in a virtual 
reality environment,” Lt. Col. Gordon Phillips, 705th Exercise Control Squadron 
Commander [51]  
 
Because of the dramatic improvements in the intensity of the virtual environment, 
including the ability to pause the action, the Virtual Flag exercise allows every training 
objective to be covered [51].  Given the relatively small number of simulators, however, 
this training is only available to a very limited number of participants.  Future expansion 
of Virtual Flag could create an environment on par with Red Flag in terms of the number 
of aircrew members trained.  The benefits of this environment are incredible, in that, the 
scenarios do not have to be scaled-back to compensate for physical airspace restrictions 
or safety, as is so often the case today in Red Flag.  
JEFX 
The Air Force Experimentation Office (AFEO) stood up on January 1, 1999 to 
grow and administer a series of Joint Expeditionary Force Experiments (JEFXs) 
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 exploring emerging technologies, tactics and requirements and enhance Air Force 
capabilities [54].  Held every two years, these experiments have come to represent the 
most comprehensive combination of live fly and simulation technologies using effects 
based operations.  The JEFX is a unique environment developed to explore processes in a 
large and realistic net-centric environment.  The results of these experiments allow Joint, 
DoD and coalition partners to realistically identify, analyze, and plan for future 
modernization decisions.    
Experiments vs. Exercises 
The experimentation process is fundamental to the way the Air Force evolves but 
its environment differs significantly from a training venue.  Exercises exist to train forces 
while experiments give insight into the validity of future investments.  The JEFX is not a 
classical scientific experiment but more of a concept demonstration environment.   
Terminal Fury 
 This US Pacific Command exercise began October 2002 to test the contingency 
response of the Joint Task Force 519 [55].  This is an operational-level planning exercise, 
similar to Blue Flag, encompassing joint and coalition partners. 
USAFWS Mission Employment Phase 
The USAF Weapons School syllabus culminates in a one-week capstone phase 
called Mission Employment.  This weeklong training focuses on student learning, within 
a multi-platform environment, to plan and execute a small-scale air campaign.  The 
missions are roughly half the size of a Red Flag but involve much more highly trained 
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 and experienced participants.  The objectives are to push the limits of large force tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. 
Maple Flag 
The Maple Flag exercise was born out of Red Flag when in 1977 the Canadian 
Commander of Air Command invited the United States to hold a northern exercise in 
Cold Lake, Alberta [56].  This exercise uses the Cold Lake Air Weapons Range, which is 
similar in size to the NTTR but lacks the terrain and robustness of enemy defenses at 
Nellis AFB.  The Maple Flag exercises tend to have a wider range of international 
participation when compared to Red Flag, with scenarios geared toward employment as a 
coalition force.  The Mission Commander at Maple Flag is just as likely to be from an 
Allied nation as from the US with adversary forces traditionally led by the USAF 
Aggressors.   
Northern Edge 
The Northern Edge exercise has evolved from a cold climate training exercise to a 
robust multi-agency test of Alaska's homeland defense plan.  The Jack Frost exercise, set 
in motion in 1975, followed by Brim Frost and Arctic Warrior through the 80's and early 
90's, trained forces in arctic and winter environments.  Northern Edge began in 1993 as a 
Joint exercise focused on operational command and control of the Alaskan Command 
[57].  The exercise evolved into the most recent venue, Northern Edge 2006, which 
incorporated 5,000 personnel, 110 aircraft, a Carrier Air Wing, and two Navy destroyers 
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 [57].  This is one of the few exercises combining the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air 
Force in a homeland defense scenario with air, land, sea and space domains exploited.  
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 Appendix B – Cyberspace Primer 
This appendix provides additional background on the definition and models used 
to define cyberspace. 
Models 
There has been a great deal of work done in the area of modeling the cyberspace 
domain.  If you can accurately depict cyberspace using a diagram, the likelihood of 
someone understanding increases markedly.  During the course of this research effort, 
several models stood out as good representations of cyberspace.  
It is important to understand that in a net-centric environment, the flow of data 
and information through cyberspace provides a capability to link specific network nodes.  
A “node” could be a computer, aircraft, person, or a multitude of other devices.  The 
models at Figure 8-11 provide varying depictions of cyberspace.  The Woolley Model, 
Figure 8, shows the interaction of data and information within cyberspace as the glue that 
ties together the physical, cognitive, and cyber domains.  The Franz B-21 Model, Figure 
9, represents the physical and cognitive domains as spheres encompassed by the 
information domain.  Finally, the Wong-Jiru and Mills Model, Figure 10, depicts layers 
of networks with the information providing linkages between them.  By combining 
elements of these three models, this researcher provides the model at Figure 11 as a way 
to highlight what is effective within each of the previous illustrations of cyberspace.  This 
model represents the layering of networks with the associated linkages all encompassed 
by the information domain.  Information can flow through the physical network linkages 
within a layer, or between layers through the cyberspace surrounding the nodes (e.g., the 
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 electromagnetic spectrum).  Using this amalgamated model, Figure 11 also depicts the 
cyberspace domain as surrounding networks within a battlefield environment.  This is a 
baseline for representing the scope of this thesis in terms of a realistic training 
environment for cyberspace.  The Figure 11 model depicts where attacks on network 
nodes or linkages between those nodes achieve effects within the physical or cognitive 
domains.  The ultimate goal is to affect the top layer decision-making process so that the 
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) process is inhibited for the enemy and protected 
for blue forces.        
 
Figure 8 Woolley Cyberspace Model [58] 
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Figure 9 Franz Cyberspace Model [36] 
Systems / Applications 
Network Arch (physical) 
Network Arch (virtual) 
Organizations 
Communities of Interest 
People / Users 
Mission / Task 
Subordinate Tasks 
 
Figure 10 Wong-Jiru and Mills Cyberspace Model [59] 
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OODA 
Figure 11 The NCW Battlefield 
Putting It All Together 
Understand cyberspace and the possibilities it brings to warfighting, comes 
through integrating these models into the joint planning paradigm.  A significant 
challenge is identifying which agencies within the Air Force can achieve the desired 
capabilities within cyberspace.  Figure 12 depicts the current Air Force Computer 
Network Operations (CNO) structure.  The 315th IOS and the 91st Network Warfare 
Squadron (NWS) are the primary units responsible for Network Attack (Net-A) in the Air 
Force.   
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Figure 12 The Air Force CNO Structure
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Appendix C – Cyber Flag CONOPS 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The Cyber Flag Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlines the Air Force way 
ahead for realistic training in air, space, and cyberspace.  This CONOPS identifies the 
requirements necessary to train forces in the air, space and cyberspace domains by 
leveraging existing capabilities and defining future technologies. 
1.2 Background 
In April of 1975 the Directorate of Operations, Headquarters Air Force provided a 
CONOPS briefing for an exercise called Red Flag to attendees of the Fighter Weapons 
Symposium [15].  The CONOPS detailed Red Flag as a single exercise providing the 
most realistic training environment possible for aircrews to simulate the first ten combat 
missions.  The idea was that by realistically simulating the first ten combat missions the 
survival of pilots would markedly improve during actual combat.  With the concept 
approved on 15 July 1975, the first Red Flag began on 27 November 1975 [15]. 
Using existing assets at either Red Flag-Alaska or Red Flag-Nellis this CONOPS 
provides a vision for a dedicated exercise intended to emphasize cyberspace capabilities 
and the way in which they can and will change the face of war fighting. 
1.3 Authority 
In his 2007 “Letter to Airman” Secretary Michael W. Wynne conveyed the 
following vision:  “Red Flag exercises, well known as training components of air 
warfare, will also become a staple of cyber warfare. [17]”  The conflict with existing Red 
Flag training objectives dictates the creation of a separate venue for the exercise of 
cyberspace forces in concert with those from air and space. 
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 1.4 Relationship to other AF CONOPS 
This CONOPS supplements the Air Combat Command (ACC) CONOPS for the 
57th Adversary Tactics Group (ATG) Aggressors, 10 October 2006.   
2.0 Synopsis 
2.1 CONOPS 
 This CONOPS outlines an overarching plan to integrate cyberspace into the 
operational and tactical levels of Air Force training.  More specifically, this document 
defines a roadmap for establishing a realistic training venue, which encompasses air, 
space and cyberspace domains.  The 57 ATG at Nellis AFB, NV represents “Threats 
Central” for the USAF [64]. In this capacity, the 57 ATG represents the most fertile 
ground for the development of the Cyber Flag exercise.    
2.2 Objectives 
The ACC CONOPS for the 57 ATG states: 
“In addition, warfighters need to understand their dependence on 
information systems and communication links and be prepared to operate 
in information-degraded environments.  USAF planners require proper 
training in an operationally realistic environment that challenges their 
ability to achieve operational success, while facing a determined and 
skilled adversary.” [64] 
 
This is achievable to some degree within the existing Red Flag construct but both 
the competing goals associated with demonstrating effects within cyberspace as well as 
the sheer breadth of the evolving cyber infrastructure (both in the civilian and military 
environments) warrant a separate realistic training venue.  Cyber Flag provides the 
overarching objective of demonstrating the critical capabilities of offensive and defensive 
actions within cyberspace in concert with traditional kinetic operations. 
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 2.3 Phased Approach 
Because of the fiscal constraints associated with creating a dedicated exercise, 
three courses of action (COA) provide decision-making options in realizing the overall 
objective of Cyber Flag.   
2.3.1. COA 1: The first option is to extend deployed forces for a one-week period 
after a Red Flag to support Cyber Flag.  The table below provides a sample flow for the 
week.  
Day M Tu W Th F 
Threat  Thailand India Russia China China 
Level I II III III III 
Types C2 C2 & 
SCADA 
C2 & SCADA C2&Airborne All 
Vulnerability Patches Patches & 
Protocol 
Patches & 
Protocol 
Phishing, 
Virus Worm 
All 
Effect Scans 
(IPB) 
Scans & 
Hooks 
Web Page 
Deface, 
Anomalous 
Activity  
Data 
Extraction, 
DOS, EA 
All 
 
The threat levels provide a graduated learning environment where: 
Level I: Benign Targets 
Level II: Defended Targets 
Level III: Aggressive Target (i.e. shoots back) 
These threats and target types represent the current focus for operational planning 
and tactical employment during the week of Cyber Flag.  The networks supporting the 
operational planning would be subject to the effects listed above given the type of 
vulnerabilities that exist.  The CAOC would be under constant attack and ATO 
production must continue to fuel the tactical missions.  If it is impractical to have the 
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 Nellis CAOC attacked, then a notional CAOC, tied to the Joint IO range, could produce 
products in parallel with those used to fly actual missions.  Mission planning would 
ensure target pairing to both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.   
Pros:  This option would preserve existing Red Flag training objectives 
accomplished during the previous week’s missions.  The cyberspace domain would be 
the emphasis of the additional week of training.  This is an optimal scenario because it 
allows a robust Air Expeditionary Force to employ together against the most realistic 
threat while focusing on the enabling effects within cyberspace. 
 Cons:  Funding for unit deployments would have to be increased but costs 
compared to deploying and redeploying the necessary forces are minimal.   
2.3.2. COA 2:  Another option is to create a network infrastructure like Bulwark 
Defender with nodes at Air Force Bases that have aircraft.  The table below provides a 
suggested force structure with associated participants.   
Squadron Role Base 
1st Fighter Wing (F-15 / F-22) Offensive Counter Air / Red 
Air 
Langley AFB, VA 
ACC NOSC / INOSC Command and Control Langley AFB, VA 
2nd Bomb Wing (B-52) Interdiction / Strike Barksdale AFB, LA 
AFNOC Command and Control Barksdale AFB, LA 
8th AF CAOC Barksdale AFB, LA 
33 IOS Net-D Lackland AFB, TX 
315 IOS Net-A Ft George Mead, MD 
355th Wing (A-10) CAOC / CAS David Monthan, AZ 
SOCOM CAOC Hurlburt AFB, FL 
57 IAS Information Aggressors Nellis AFB, NV 
 
Aggressors would conduct network warfare against the operational command 
elements of the network while Blue Forces task aircraft to provide tactical support.  In 
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 addition, aggressors would implement elements of CNA, CND, PSYOPS and EW at the 
tactical level by targeting base-level communications infrastructure. 
 Pros:  This would be the lowest cost option for Cyber Flag because bases could 
support the exercise without the deployment of aircraft.  The aircraft could also fly 
alternate missions if the cyber effects prevented them from executing the primary tasking.  
A base-level exercise would also exhibit a broad range of cyber effects to a very diverse 
audience including communications, maintenance, aviation, and security police 
personnel.  Jamming could take place against cell phones and land mobile radios.  
Internet attacks could start with propaganda via web pages and phishing attacks aimed at 
gaining network access.  The escalation of the exercise could then see complete denial of 
service attacks against networks on base similar to an “Alarm Black” type event during a 
Phase II. 
 Cons: This would require base-level participation similar to a Phase II exercise.  
Nearly all base operations would necessarily cease except those supporting the exercise. 
2.3.3 COA 3:  The final option is to deploy forces for a dedicated Cyber Flag 
exercise in which the objectives support effects based primarily on non-kinetic means. 
 Pros: There is nothing better than a dedicated venue for highlighting the enabling 
capabilities of cyberspace. 
Cons: The lack of money available to spend on additional training or to upgrade 
existing training is a growing concern.  There will have to be a tremendous 
reprioritization of funding for training and programs to enable this type of Cyber Flag.   
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 3.0 Time Horizon, Assumptions and Risks 
3.1 Time Horizon 
A Cyber Flag exercise utilizing COA 1 is feasible within the current or next Fiscal 
Year, if funding for additional exercise days exists.  Based on existing Red Flag and Air 
Expeditionary Force flows, COA 2 and 3 allow implementation within Fiscal Year (FY) 
09 at the earliest.    
3.2 Assumptions 
 This document assumes the existing timeline for FY 11 ATG end strength.  
3.3 Risks 
 As ACC CONOPS for the 57 ATG states: 
“Threat identification and focus will be inherent risks of this program.  
The Aggressors must strike a balance between accurately replicating the 
range of threats AF forces may encounter and risking a dilution of their 
efforts, by trying to train themselves and their audience for too many 
things and none well.” [64] 
4.0 The Overall Military Challenge 
4.1 General 
 The continued downsizing of the Air Force means fewer resources (people and 
money) to support an increasing number of requirements.  The addition of a new exercise 
requires a significant amount of funding.  As a result, there must be an analytical effort to 
define the true funding priorities given the potential threat.  The threats within cyberspace 
present significant challenges to both the US, in general, and the USAF, in particular, 
requiring a proportionate level of emphasis on training.   
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 4.2 Description  
 The 57th ATG relies on the 57th Information Aggressor Squadron (IAS) to 
provide a representative cyberspace threat to Red Flag participants.  To realize this 
objective, however, information aggressors jeopardize aircrew-training requirements.   
5.0 Desired Operational Effects  
5.1 End-state 
The overall effect of Cyber Flag is to create a realization across the Air Force 
regarding the importance of cyberspace capabilities and to provide in-depth training to 
meet the rapidly and ever-increasing cyber threat on a national and military basis.   
5.2 Desired Effects 
This venue provides USAF and Joint training against a realistic threat presented 
through air, space and cyberspace leading to the development of blue tactics, techniques 
and procedures.  
6.0 Necessary Capabilities 
 The Joint Information Operations (IO) Range and a suitable conventional range, 
such as the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), are necessary for Cyber Flag. 
7.0 Enabling Capabilities 
 The capability to replicate red and blue network environments on the Joint IO 
Range is necessary to present a realistic cyberspace-training environment.  The 
Virtualized Intranet Platform for Exercise Realism (VIPER) provides this capability 
using the Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT).  
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 8.0 Command Relationships / Architecture 
 The existing command structure of the 57 ATG is preserved under this CONOPS 
with the administration of the Cyber Flag exercise falling under the 57 Adversary Tactics 
Support Squadron, the 414 Combat Training Squadron (Red Flag), and the 57 IAS. 
9.0 Summary 
 In accordance with the CSAF vision for the 57 ATG, this CONOPS provides a 
robust threat environment to enhance training in air, space and cyberspace. 
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